F5CAB4 Exam Dumps - F5-CA Questions and Answers

In a High Availability pair, the "Force to Standby" action is a Control Plane command used to trigger a manual failover. This option is only logical and available on the device that is currently in the Active state. If the button is greyed out, it indicates that the administrator is already logged into the Standby unit, which has no active traffic groups to relinquish.

A QKView is a comprehensive snapshot of the device's Control Plane state, configuration, and logs used for troubleshooting. By default, the qkview utility stores its generated output file in the /var/tmp/ directory. Administrators must know this path to retrieve the file for upload to F5 iHealth or Support.

The User Configuration Set (UCS) is a flexible tool designed by the Control Plane to handle various lifecycle management scenarios, including upgrades and hardware migrations.

Version Compatibility (Option B): TMOS is designed to be backward compatible. The Control Plane can ingest a UCS file created on an older version of software and automatically upgrade the configuration objects to match the current, later version during the restore process.

Platform Portability (Option C): While a UCS archive contains platform-specific information, the BIG-IP system allows for "platform-independent" restores. This is a vital procedural concept for migrating from one hardware model to another or from physical hardware to a Virtual Edition (VE).

Management of State: When restoring to a different platform or a later version, the administrator often uses specific flags (such as no-license or platform-migrate in later versions) to ensure that only the portable configuration data is applied while preserving the new platform's unique identifiers.

watch-devicegroup-device shows (among other columns) the commit ID (cid.id / shown here as clu_id), the originating device for that commit (cid-orig / shown here as cl_orig), and the time the configuration change was made (cid.time / shown here as cl_time). The highest/newest commit ID and its time represent the most recent configuration change seen among the devices. (clouddocs.f5.com)

bigip_a has the latest configuration (A) because it shows commit ID 3273 at 14:27:00, which is newer than commit ID 1745 at 13:52:34 on bigip_b and bigip_c. (clouddocs.f5.com)

Two devices are out of date (B) because bigip_b and bigip_c are still on the older commit ID 1745, so they do not match the latest commit shown on bigip_a. (clouddocs.f5.com)

Why the other options are not supported by this output:

C is not supported: bigip_c is not showing a newer commit than the others; it’s on the older commit (1745), so it’s not the source of the most recent change. The output’s cid-orig column is what tells you where the change was made. (clouddocs.f5.com)

D/E are incorrect logic: matching cid.time between two devices only indicates they share the same change timestamp/commit, not that it is the correct or latest configuration. The “latest” is indicated by the newest commit ID/time (here, bigip_a). (clouddocs.f5.com)

The audit log (/var/log/audit) records configuration changes made on the BIG-IP system, including:

Who made the change (user account)

What was changed (for example, a virtual server modification)

When the change occurred

How it was performed (GUI, TMSH, or API)

Why the other options are incorrect:

/var/log/secure logs authentication events such as login successes and failures, not configuration changes.

/var/log/ltm logs traffic-management and runtime LTM events, not administrative configuration modifications.

Therefore, the correct log file for tracking who changed a virtual server is /var/log/audit.

Management connectivity is protected by an allowed access list for the httpd daemon. Unlike TMM data ports which use 'Port Lockdown' settings, the management port's access is controlled by a specific 'Allow' list. If an administrator's IP is not explicitly included in this list, the Control Plane will reject HTTPS connection attempts to the management utility.

Comprehensive and Detailed Explanation From BIG-IP Administration Con10trol Plane Administration documents: Placing a device in the FORCED_OFFLINE state is a critical procedural concept for HA maintenance111213. 1415Unlike simply being 'Standby16', the FORCED_OFFLINE state ensures tha17t the Control Plane will not participate in failover selection, effectively preventing the device from becoming 'Active' even if the peer fails18. This state also allows the administrator to terminate existing connections to ensure no traffic is being processed during the maintenance window19.

A BIG-IP device group cannot be deleted if it still contains device members, even if one of those devices has already been decommissioned or is unreachable. Before deleting the device group, the administrator must explicitly remove the decommissioned device from the device group configuration.

Once the removed or unreachable device is deleted from the device group membership, the BIG-IP system allows the remaining administrator to successfully delete the device group.

Why the other options are incorrect:

A. Remove all members from the device groupThis is not required; the key requirement is removing the decommissioned device, not all members.

B. Make sure all members are in syncSynchronization status does not prevent device group deletion.

D. Disable the device groupDevice groups cannot be disabled; they must be modified or deleted.

Therefore, the correct prerequisite action is to remove the decommissioned device from the device group, making C the correct answer.

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Comprehensive and Detailed Explanation From BIG-IP A34dministration Control Plane Administration documents: Authentication and authorization events are handled by the system's PAM (Pluggable Authentication Modules). For Control Plane security auditing, all login attempts—whether local or remote (LDAP/RADIUS/TACACS+)—and SSH-related security events are recorded in /var/log/secure. This is the primary log for troubleshooting administrative access issues

Connectivity management requires a proper logical-to-physical mapping within the BIG-IP Control Plane.

VLAN Association: In TMOS, a Self IP address is not assigned directly to a physical interface. Instead, it is assigned to a VLAN (Virtual Local Area Network) object.

Procedural Troubleshooting: If a Self IP is unreachable, the primary failure point is often that the IP was associated with the wrong VLAN, or the VLAN itself is not correctly associated with the intended physical interface or trunk.

Layer 2 Mapping: The Control Plane requires the VLAN to be "up" and "untagged" or "tagged" on a valid interface for traffic to flow. If the administrator selects the incorrect VLAN, the Self IP will exist in the configuration but will be logically isolated from the physical network wire.