212-89 Exam Dumps - ECCouncil ECIH Questions and Answers

Once malware is identified, ECIH guidance requires responders to analyze before eradication to understand scope, infection vectors, persistence mechanisms, and data impact. This ensures effective removal and prevents reinfection.

Option C is correct because forensic analysis allows investigators to determine how the malware entered the system, what data was accessed, and whether additional components are compromised. Without this understanding, containment and recovery efforts may be incomplete or ineffective.

Option A is a containment step but does not address root cause. Option B is a notification step that must be supported by verified facts. Option D protects future data but does not address the active malware.

Therefore, forensic analysis is the ideal primary action following detection, as emphasized in the ECIH malware handling process.

This scenario involves a high-privilege insider threat, one of the most difficult risks to detect. ECIH emphasizes that senior executives often have broad access, making role-based restrictions impractical.

Option A is correct because advanced employee monitoring and behavioral analytics can detect abnormal access patterns, data exfiltration trends, and deviations from established baselines—even for executives. These tools operate within legal and policy frameworks while providing actionable alerts.

Options B and C reduce efficiency and are easily bypassed. Option D is intrusive and ineffective for digital exfiltration.

ECIH identifies behavioral monitoring as the most effective control for detecting malicious insiders with legitimate access, making Option A correct.

Splunk is a powerful tool for log analysis, capable of collecting, analyzing, and visualizing data from various sources in real time. For an incident handler like Drake, intending to detect traces of malicious activities within the network infrastructure, Splunk can efficiently parse large volumes of log data, enabling the identification of patterns and anomalies that may indicate malware propagation or other security incidents. Its real-time analysis capabilities make it an ideal tool for monitoring network activities and responding to incidents promptly.

The data preprocessing step performed by Johnson, where he analyzes user activities within a certain time period to create time-ordered domain sequences for further analysis on sequential patterns, is known as user-specific sessionization. This process involves aggregating all user activities and requests into discrete sessions based on the individual user, allowing for a coherent analysis of user behavior over time. This is critical for identifying patterns that may indicate a watering hole attack, where attackers compromise a site frequently visited by the target group to distribute malware. User-specific sessionization helps in isolating and examining sequences of actions taken by users, making it easier to detect anomalies or patterns indicative of such an attack.

An active assessment involves using automated tools to scan and probe the network actively to identify hosts, services, and vulnerabilities. This type of assessment directly interacts with the network components to gather information about the existing security posture, unlike passive assessments, which analyze traffic without sending packets to the target systems. Dickson's approach, employing automated tools to identify the network's hosts, services, and vulnerabilities, fits the definition of an active assessment. This method provides a more immediate understanding of the network's vulnerabilities, allowing for timely remediation actions.

This scenario describes an evil twin attack, a well-documented wireless network threat covered in the ECIH Network Security Incidents module. An evil twin attack occurs when an attacker sets up a rogue wireless access point that mimics the SSID of a legitimate network. Unsuspecting users connect to the stronger or more accessible signal, allowing attackers to intercept credentials, inject malware, or perform man-in-the-middle attacks.

Option A is correct because the presence of an unauthorized access point broadcasting the same SSID and causing authentication failures is a defining indicator of an evil twin attack. Users may unknowingly connect to the malicious access point, leading to repeated disconnections from the legitimate network.

Option B would not involve a rogue access point. Option C focuses on identity spoofing at the MAC layer but does not explain SSID duplication. Option D involves IP address assignment issues, not SSID impersonation.

ECIH emphasizes that identifying rogue wireless infrastructure quickly is critical to containment. Detecting evil twin attacks allows responders to isolate the rogue device, protect credentials, and restore secure wireless operations.

The EC-Council Incident Handler (ECIH) curriculum identifies email spoofing as a common technique in business email compromise (BEC) attacks. Attackers exploit weak or misconfigured DNS-based email authentication controls to forge sender identities.

Sender Policy Framework (SPF), DomainKeys Identified Mail (DKIM), and Domain-based Message Authentication, Reporting, and Conformance (DMARC) are DNS-based mechanisms that validate legitimate email senders and prevent spoofing. Proper configuration ensures that receiving mail servers can verify message authenticity and reject forged communications.

In this scenario, unsecured DNS entries enabled identity relay spoofing. Strengthening SPF, DKIM, and DMARC directly addresses the root cause and prevents recurring forged message injections. This is a clear eradication measure aimed at eliminating the exploitation pathway.

Options A and B relate to review and analysis phases. Option C supports threat intelligence sharing but does not remediate the internal DNS weakness.

Therefore, strengthening SPF, DKIM, and DMARC configurations is the appropriate eradication strategy.

This scenario describes a Remote File Inclusion (RFI) vulnerability. RFI occurs when user-controlled input is used to load external resources into server-side execution contexts. Attackers often use numeric IP addresses and malformed parameters to evade basic filtering.

ECIH identifies RFI as a high-risk web application attack that can lead to malware execution, data leakage, and system compromise. Because the application dynamically loads external content without validation, Option D is correct.

The port scanning technique that involves resetting the TCP connection between the client and server abruptly before the completion of the three-way handshake, thereby leaving the connection half-open, is known as a Stealth scan (also referred to as a SYN scan). This technique allows the scanner to inquire about the status of a port without establishing a full TCP connection, making the scan less detectible to intrusion detection systems and less likely to be logged by the target. It's a method used to discreetly discover open ports on a target machine without establishing a full connection that would be visible in logs.