312-49v11 Exam Dumps - ECCouncil CHFI Questions and Answers

According to the CHFI v11 Cloud Forensics objectives, cloud environments rely heavily onvirtualization, where multiple virtual machines share the same underlying physical hardware such as CPU caches, memory, storage, and network interfaces. Attackers can exploit this shared-resource model by intentionally placing malicious VMs on the same physical host as the victim VM, a technique often referred to asco-residency attacks. Once co-residency is achieved, attackers performside-channel attacksthat analyze indirect indicators such as cache timing, memory access patterns, or CPU usage to infer sensitive information.

This scenario precisely describes theexploitation of shared resources for side-channel attacks. Timing vulnerabilities in shared CPU caches or memory buses allow attackers to extract cryptographic keys, credentials, or other sensitive data without directly breaching the target system. After obtaining credentials, attackers may impersonate legitimate users, escalating the impact of the attack.

Other options are incorrect because DNS hijacking (Option B) targets name resolution, SQL injection (Option D) operates at the application layer, and VM overloading (Option A) is typically associated with denial-of-service rather than covert data extraction.

The CHFI v11 blueprint explicitly addressescloud computing threats and attacks, emphasizing risks introduced bymulti-tenancy, shared infrastructure, and virtualization, making side-channel exploitation a critical forensic and security concern in cloud investigations

According to theCHFI v11 Procedures and Methodologydomain, ensuring precision and reliability in a digital forensic laboratory requires aholistic approachthat integrates multiple best practices rather than relying on a single control. CHFI v11 explicitly emphasizes that forensic accuracy and legal defensibility are achieved only whenall critical quality assurance components work together.

Regular equipment maintenanceensures that forensic hardware and software operate correctly and consistently, preventing errors caused by malfunctioning tools.Adherence to industry standards, such asISO/IEC 17025andASCLD/LAB accreditation, establishes validated procedures, standardized workflows, and documented methodologies that courts recognize as trustworthy. These standards ensure repeatability, reproducibility, and credibility of forensic results.

Equally important iscontinuous investigator training, as digital technologies, file systems, operating systems, and attack techniques evolve rapidly. CHFI v11 stresses that investigators must stay current with new tools, emerging threats, and updated forensic methods to avoid analytical errors and misinterpretation of evidence.

CHFI v11 clearly states that the absence of any one of these elements—maintenance, standards compliance, or training—can compromise forensic integrity, lead to inaccurate conclusions, and result in evidence being challenged or rejected in legal proceedings.

Therefore, the correct and CHFI v11–verified answer isAll of these, makingOption Bthe most accurate choice.

This question aligns with CHFI v11 objectives underNetwork and Web AttacksandNetwork Log Analysis. In digital forensics, network infrastructure logs are critical sources of evidence for detecting, analyzing, and reconstructing network-based attacks. CHFI v11 specifically emphasizes the forensic value of logs generated by network devices such asCisco switches, VPN gateways, and DNS servers.

Cisco switch logs provide information about device connections, port activity, MAC address mappings, VLAN assignments, and potential unauthorized access within the internal network. VPN logs reveal details about remote connections, including authentication attempts, user identities, IP addresses, session durations, and encrypted tunnel activity—crucial for identifying compromised credentials or unauthorized remote access. DNS server logs record domain name queries and responses, which help investigators detect command-and-control communication, data exfiltration attempts, malware beaconing, and access to malicious domains.

Together, these logs allow investigators to correlate events across the network, trace attacker movement, identify affected systems, and establish timelines of security incidents. The other options are incorrect because browser history is host-based evidence, and these logs are highly relevant to forensic investigations. Therefore, consistent with CHFI v11 network forensics principles, these logs provide insights into network traffic, device connections, and security incidents.

According to theCHFI v11 Computer Forensics FundamentalsandEvidence Handling and Sanitizationguidelines,media sanitizationis a critical process used to ensure that deleted or sensitive data cannot be recovered using forensic techniques. Different international standards define specific overwrite patterns and the number of passes required to securely sanitize storage media.

The procedure described—six overwrite passes alternating between 0x00 and 0xFF, followed by a final overwrite with 0xAA—exactly matches theVSITR (Verschlusssache IT Richtlinien)standard. VSITR is a German government–approved data sanitization method that mandates7 overwrite passes:

Passes 1–6: Alternating 0x00 and 0xFF

Pass 7: Final overwrite with the pattern 0xAA

CHFI v11 explicitly references VSITR as ahigh-assurance sanitization standard, suitable for environments handling classified or highly sensitive information. This method is more rigorous than commonly used standards such asDoD 5220.22-M, which typically uses 3 passes (or a legacy 7-pass variant with different patterns).NAVSO P-5239-26 (MFM)uses different overwrite schemes, andGOST P50739-95generally involves fewer passes.

From a forensic and legal standpoint, following a recognized sanitization standard like VSITR demonstratesdue diligence, compliance, and defensibility, especially when preventing data leakage after incidents.

Therefore, based on the overwrite pattern and number of passes described, the media sanitization standard followed by Sarah isVSITR, makingOption Cthe correct and CHFI v11–verified answer.

This question aligns with CHFI v11 objectives underCloud Forensics, particularly focusing on evidence acquisition and analysis in cloud environments such as Google Cloud Platform (GCP). Unlike traditional on-premises systems, cloud infrastructures rely heavily onlogs and metadataas primary sources of forensic evidence because investigators often do not have direct access to physical hardware.

CHFI v11 emphasizes that cloud service logs—such as audit logs, access logs, activity logs, and resource metadata—are crucial for reconstructing events in a cloud-based incident. In GCP, these logs record detailed information aboutuser actions, API calls, authentication attempts, resource creation or deletion, privilege changes, and interactions with cloud services. This enables investigators to trace malicious activity, identify compromised accounts, establish timelines, and attribute actions to specific users or service accounts.

While logs may incidentally include IP addresses or device-related hints, their primary forensic value lies in trackingwhat actions were performed, when they occurred, and by whom. Encryption mechanisms are predefined by the cloud provider and are not inferred from logs during investigations. Therefore, consistent with CHFI v11 cloud forensics methodology, logs and metadata are essential for tracking user actions and interactions within the GCP environment, making option D the correct answer.

According to theCHFI v11 Network and Web Attacksdomain, adirectory traversal attack(also known as path traversal) is a web-based attack in which an attacker manipulates input parameters (such as ../ sequences) to access files and directoriesoutside the intended web root. This can expose sensitive resources such as configuration files, credentials, source code, system files, and application logs.

Theprimary forensic objectivewhen investigating a directory traversal attack is todetermine the scope and impact of unauthorized access. CHFI v11 emphasizes that investigators must analyzeweb server logs, application logs, and access recordsto identify:

Which files or directories were accessed

Whether sensitive or confidential data was exposed

The time frame of the attack

The attacker’s source IP and request patterns

Whether data was viewed, downloaded, or potentially modified

Understanding theextent of data compromiseis critical for incident response, regulatory notification, damage assessment, and legal proceedings. It also helps determine whether further attacks (such as privilege escalation or lateral movement) may have occurred following the traversal exploit.

The other options are not aligned with forensic goals. Hardware configuration analysis and bandwidth optimization are operational tasks, not forensic objectives. Enhancing user experience is unrelated to incident investigation.

CHFI v11 clearly states that the focus of web attack forensics isimpact assessment and evidence reconstruction, makingdetermining unauthorized access and data compromisethe correct objective.

Therefore, the correct and CHFI v11–verified answer isOption C.

This question maps directly to CHFI v11 objectives underMobile and IoT Forensics, specifically Android device acquisition and analysis procedures. In Android forensics, communication between the device and a forensic workstation running the Android SDK is primarily achieved using theAndroid Debug Bridge (ADB). ADB enables investigators to interact with the device’s file system, retrieve logs, execute commands, and collect forensic artifacts in a controlled manner.

To use ADB,USB Debugging mode must be enabledon the Android device. CHFI v11 explicitly highlights USB debugging as a critical prerequisite for logical acquisition, live data collection, and application-level analysis on Android devices. When enabled, it allows authenticated communication between the device and the forensic workstation without requiring intrusive methods that could alter evidence unnecessarily.

USB restriction mode limits data communication, recovery mode is used mainly for system repairs or flashing firmware, and “upgrade mode” is not a standard Android forensic feature. None of these allow normal SDK-based interaction for forensic analysis. Therefore, consistent with CHFI v11 Android forensic methodology, enablingUSB debugging modeis the correct and essential step to establish communication with the Android SDK workstation.

According to the CHFI v11 objectives and theElectronic Discovery Reference Model (EDRM)framework, the activity described in this scenario corresponds to theInformation Governancestage. Information governance is the foundational phase of the EDRM cycle and focuses on establishingpolicies, procedures, controls, and standardsto manage electronic information throughout its lifecycle. This includes defining data retention schedules, access control policies, compliance requirements, preservation rules, and audit readiness.

In CHFI v11, information governance is emphasized as aproactive and strategic functionthat ensures an organization is prepared for future investigations, audits, litigation, or regulatory inquiries. By implementing governance controls after an investigation, organizations strengthen forensic readiness, reduce legal risk, and ensure that electronic data remains reliable, authentic, and admissible as evidence.

The other options do not accurately match the described activity. Disposal (Option A) refers to defensible deletion after legal hold requirements expire. Collection (Option C) involves acquiring data for analysis, while Identification (Option D) focuses on locating potentially relevant data sources. None of these address long-term policy creation or enterprise-wide data control.

The CHFI v11 Exam Blueprint explicitly includesInformation Governancewithin the eDiscovery process, highlighting its role in compliance, risk mitigation, and evidence integrity management, making Option B the correct and exam-aligned answer

According to theCHFI v11 Malware Forensics and Malware Analysis objectives, dynamic malware analysis must be performed in acontrolled, isolated, and well-monitored environmentto both observe malicious behavior and prevent unintended spread to production systems. A key requirement of such an environment is the ability tomonitor and record all system-level changesmade by the malware during execution.

Host Integrity Monitoring (HIM)plays a critical role in dynamic malware analysis by tracking modifications tofiles, registry keys, services, processes, startup locations, system calls, and configuration settings. CHFI v11 emphasizes system behavior analysis as a core component of malware forensics, including monitoring registry artifacts, file system changes, persistence mechanisms, and process activity. HIM enables investigators to safely analyze malware impact while maintaining forensic visibility and containment.

The other options are not aligned with CHFI v11 best practices.Disabling antivirus softwareweakens security controls but does not ensure containment or safety.Running malware on physical machinesincreases the risk of permanent damage and network propagation, which contradicts CHFI guidelines favoring sandboxed or virtualized environments.Using outdated operating systemsdoes not contribute to safety and may introduce irrelevant vulnerabilities.

CHFI v11 strongly advocatescontrolled malware analysis labswith monitoring mechanisms that capture behavioral indicators without exposing production assets. Therefore, implementinghost integrity monitoringis a key design aspect that supports bothsafe containment and effective behavioral analysis, makingOption Athe correct and CHFI-verified answer.

According to theCHFI v11 Mobile and IoT Forensicsobjectives, iOS devices maintain geolocation-related artifacts through thelocation services subsystem (locationd). One of the key forensic artifacts associated with this subsystem isClients.plist.

TheClients.plistfile stores information aboutapplications and system services that have requested or used location services. It contains identifiers for apps, service names, permission states, and timestamps indicating when location data was accessed. This makes it highly valuable for investigators attempting to determinewhich apps accessed location data and when, which is crucial in cases involving surveillance, stalking, fraud, or physical movement reconstruction.

The other files listed do not store geolocation data.Cookies.plistcontains browser cookie information,Sms.dbstores SMS and iMessage content, andDraftMessage.plistholds unsent message drafts. None of these files are related to GPS or location services.

CHFI v11 emphasizes correlatingClients.plistwith other artifacts such as location caches, application logs, and timestamps to reconstruct user movement and application behavior on iOS devices.

Therefore, the file that contains geolocation data of applications and system services on iOS devices—fully aligned with CHFI v11—isClients.plist, makingOption Dthe correct answer.