312-49v11 Exam Dumps - ECCouncil CHFI Questions and Answers

This scenario aligns with CHFI v11 objectives underAnti-Forensics TechniquesandBest Practices for Handling Digital Evidence. Encrypted and password-protected files are commonly used as anti-forensic techniques to conceal illicit data and delay investigations. CHFI v11 stresses that forensic investigators must follow proper legal, ethical, and procedural guidelines when dealing with encrypted evidence to ensure evidence integrity and admissibility.

When an investigator encounters a password-protected archive, the first priority is topreserve the evidenceand maintain a clear chain of custody. Documenting the file’s existence, metadata, hash values, and storage location is essential. Sending the file to a specialized decryption or cryptanalysis service—often operating under legal authorization—ensures that decryption efforts are conducted lawfully, forensically sound, and without altering the original evidence.

Using brute-force tools without authorization can violate legal boundaries, consume excessive time, and potentially modify evidence. Deleting the file would destroy potential evidence, while attempting to open it without a password is technically impossible and forensically unsound. CHFI v11 emphasizes controlled, well-documented handling of encrypted data, making documentation and specialized decryption the correct and compliant next step.

UnderCHFI v11 Computer Forensics Fundamentals, investigators must understand thelegal principles governing search and seizure of digital evidence, especially in exceptional environments such asnational border crossings. Two key legal doctrines apply directly to this scenario: theBorder Search Exceptionand thePlain View Doctrine.

TheBorder Search Exceptionallows law enforcement officers to conduct searches at international borderswithout a warrant or probable causeto protect national security and prevent cross-border crime. CHFI v11 highlights border environments as special jurisdictions where warrant requirements are relaxed due to the government’s heightened authority to regulate entry and exit of persons and goods.

Additionally, thePlain View Doctrinepermits officers to seize and examine evidenceimmediately visibleduring a lawful arrest, provided the officer is legally present and the incriminating nature of the evidence is obvious. In this case, the laptop is in the suspect’s immediate possession, and evidence of the crime is visible without manipulation.

CHFI v11 emphasizes that delaying action in such situations could result inevidence destruction, encryption, or remote wiping, especially with digital devices. Therefore, securing and searching the laptop immediately is justified and legally defensible.

The other options are incorrect because they impose unnecessary delays or conditions not required under border search authority. Therefore, fully aligned with CHFI v11 principles, the correct action is thatthe officer may search the laptop without a warrant, makingOption Bthe correct answer.

Within the CHFI v11 syllabus underOperating System ForensicsandImage/Evidence Examination and Event Correlation, timeline reconstruction is a core forensic technique used to understandwhat happened, when it happened, and in what order. When analyzing NTFS file systems, investigators rely heavily onMAC times—Modified, Accessed, and Createdtimestamps—to establish file activity.

The Sleuth Kit toolsflsandmactimeare specifically designed for this purpose. Theflstool extracts file and directory metadata from a forensic image, whilemactimeprocesses this metadata to generate a chronological timeline of file system events. This timeline typically includesfile creation time, last modification time, and last access time, allowing investigators to correlate file activity with known incident times, user actions, or attacker behavior.

Option B describes low-level file system analysis, which is useful in other contexts but is not the primary focus ofmactime. Option C relates to system-level operational timelines rather than file activity. Option D focuses on Windows event logs, which are valuable for corroboration but are separate from NTFS file system timestamp analysis.

The CHFI v11 Exam Blueprint explicitly highlightsfile system timeline creation and analysis using The Sleuth Kit, emphasizing MAC timestamps as the foundational data used to reconstruct sequences of events during digital investigations

This question aligns directly with CHFI v11 objectives underComputer Forensics FundamentalsandLog Analysis. Log files are among the most critical forensic artifacts because they provide achronological and authoritative record of system, security, and application events. CHFI v11 emphasizes that logs are essential for reconstructing attack timelines, identifying unauthorized access attempts, and determining the scope of a compromise.

Artifacts such asfailed sign-in attempts,security policy modifications,IDS alerts, andapplication errorsare routinely recorded in log sources including Windows Security logs, system logs, application logs, firewall logs, and IDS/IPS logs. These logs allow investigators to correlate events across systems, identify brute-force attacks, detect privilege escalation, and recognize abnormal behavior caused by malware or misconfiguration.

Cryptographic artifacts focus on key usage and encryption operations, browser artifacts relate to user web activity, and process or memory artifacts provide insight into live execution states—but none provide thecomprehensive, event-based historical visibilityrequired to answer all aspects of the question. CHFI v11 highlights log analysis as the primary method for understandingwhat happened, when it happened, how it happened, and who was involved. Therefore,log file anomaliesare the most relevant and reliable forensic artifacts in this scenario.

This question maps directly to CHFI v11 objectives underData Acquisition and DuplicationandData Acquisition Formats. CHFI v11 clearly explains that theRAW (dd) image formatis the most widely used and universally supported forensic image format. RAW images are exact bit-by-bit copies of storage media and do not rely on proprietary structures, compression, or vendor-specific software. This makes them ideal when investigators require maximum compatibility across multiple forensic tools and platforms.

The RAW format is simple, uncompressed, and transparent, allowing it to be analyzed by nearly all forensic suites such as Autopsy, FTK, EnCase, and The Sleuth Kit. CHFI v11 emphasizes that RAW images are preferred when long-term accessibility, court admissibility, and tool independence are critical requirements.

AFF and AFF4 formats provide advanced features such as metadata storage and compression, but they require specific tool support and are not as universally accessible. Proprietary formats are discouraged because they limit interoperability and may introduce legal or technical constraints. Therefore, adopting the RAW format best satisfies the requirement for simplicity, broad compatibility, and forensic soundness as defined in CHFI v11 standards.

This scenario aligns with CHFI v11 objectives underStandards and Best Practices Related to Computer Forensics, specifically theENFSI Best Practices for the Forensic Examination of Digital Technology. According to ENFSI guidelines, once evidence has been seized and secured, a structuredlaboratory assessmentmust be conducted before and during analysis. This phase focuses on evaluating exhibits, determining examination priorities, and maintaining detailed documentation of all items—whether analyzed immediately or deferred.

Maintaining records of both analyzed and non-analyzed exhibits is a key ENFSI requirement, as it ensures transparency, traceability, and accountability throughout the forensic process. CHFI v11 emphasizes that proper documentation allows investigators to track investigative progress, justify examination decisions, and demonstrate that no evidence was overlooked or mishandled. This practice also supports effective case management and preserves the integrity and admissibility of evidence in legal proceedings.

The other options describe different forensic phases: case evaluation occurs earlier at a strategic level, scene assessment applies to on-site evidence handling, and data acquisition refers specifically to extraction activities. In contrast, documenting and prioritizing exhibits in a controlled environment is a core function of thelaboratory assessment, making option C the correct ENFSI-aligned answer.

According to theCHFI v11 Mobile Device and Database Forensics objectives, SQLite databases are extensively used byAndroid, iOS, and many mobile applicationsto store structured data such as SMS messages, call logs, contacts, emails, browser history, and application data. Proper extraction of this data requires usingSQLite-aware forensic methodsto preserve data integrity and ensure completeness.

The.dump commandin SQLite is a standard and forensically sound method used to extract theentire database schema and contentsinto a readable SQL text format. This command exports table structures and records, allowing investigators to reconstruct the database accurately and analyze it without altering the original evidence. CHFI v11 highlights the use ofcommand-line SQLite utilitiesas reliable tools for examining mobile database artifacts recovered from logical acquisitions, physical acquisitions, or memory dumps.

Option B is incorrect because .extract is not a standard SQLite command. Option C violates forensic best practices, as raw memory data must be parsed using appropriate database tools to interpret SQLite structures correctly. Option D refers to analyzing a specific file but does not describe theextraction process itself, making it incomplete as a procedural answer.

CHFI v11 emphasizes that investigators must useproper database extraction techniques, such as SQLite command-line tools or validated forensic software, to ensure evidence admissibility and accurate interpretation. Therefore, using theSQLite .dump commandis the correct and CHFI-aligned approach, makingOption Athe correct answer.

In CHFI v11,memory dump analysisfocuses on identifyingvolatile artifacts, such as running processes, loaded modules, decrypted data, network connections, and application-specific memory remnants. The availability of Tor Browser artifacts in memory is highly dependent on theexecution and installation stateof the Tor Browser at the time of acquisition.

When theTor Browser is opened, it generates the highest number of artifacts in memory. These include active Tor processes, circuit information, encryption keys, temporary buffers, and cached session data. Even when theTor Browser is closed but still installed, some residual artifacts may remain in memory or be partially recoverable due to delayed memory reuse, along with indirect indicators such as prefetch references and previously allocated memory pages.

However, when theTor Browser is uninstalled, there are no active Tor-related processes or associated memory segments loaded into RAM. As explicitly covered in the CHFI v11 blueprint underTor Browser ForensicsandForensic Analysis: Tor Browser Uninstalled, uninstalling Tor significantly reduces both volatile and non-volatile artifacts. Consequently, memory dumps acquired after uninstallation contain theleast possible number of recoverable Tor artifacts, often limited to overwritten or non-attributable memory fragments.

Therefore, based strictly on CHFI v11 objectives and forensic principles,Tor browser uninstalled (Option B)is the correct answer.

This question aligns with CHFI v11 objectives underCloud Forensics, particularlyGoogle Cloud audit log analysis and authentication event investigation. In Google Cloud Platform (GCP), authentication-related events—such as login attempts, failed authentications, suspicious access behavior, and account lockouts—are handled by theGoogle Login API service. CHFI v11 emphasizes that when investigators are examining suspected credential compromise or password leaks, they must focus onauthentication and identity-related logsrather than general administrative or configuration logs.

The filter

protopayload.resource.labels.service="login.googleapis.com"

targets audit log entries generated by the login service, which records successful and failed login attempts, abnormal authentication behavior, and security enforcement actions such as temporary account lockouts caused by repeated failed logins. These events are critical indicators when determining whether a password leak resulted in account disabling.

The other options are less suitable: admin.googleapis.com focuses on administrative actions, the activity log name is broad and not specific to authentication failures, and metadata parameter filters do not directly isolate login-related events. Therefore, consistent with CHFI v11 cloud forensic methodology, filtering logs by thelogin.googleapis.comservice is the most effective way to identify whether a password leak caused a user account to be disabled.

According to the CHFI v11 objectives underMobile and IoT Forensics, understanding theiOS architecture stackis essential for both application analysis and forensic investigations. The iOS architecture is divided into four primary layers: Cocoa Touch, Media Services, Core Services, and Core OS. Each layer provides specific frameworks and capabilities.

In this scenario, Alice is working withOpenGL ES,OpenAL, andAV Foundation, which are all core frameworks associated withgraphics rendering, audio processing, and multimedia handling. These technologies reside in theMedia Services Layer, making Option D the correct answer. The Media Services layer is responsible for supporting 2D/3D graphics, audio, video playback, and media capture—critical components for immersive gaming and multimedia applications.

The Cocoa Touch layer (Option A) focuses on user interface elements and application-level interactions. The Core Services layer (Option C) provides foundational services such as data persistence, networking, and location services. The Core OS layer (Option B) operates closest to the hardware, handling memory management, security, and low-level system operations. None of these layers directly provide the multimedia frameworks highlighted in the scenario.

CHFI v11 explicitly includesiOS architecture and boot processas part of mobile forensics, emphasizing the Media Services layer as the source of multimedia frameworks commonly examined during application and malware analysis on iOS devices