312-49v11 Exam Dumps - ECCouncil CHFI Questions and Answers

According to the CHFI v11 objectives underData Acquisition,Digital Evidence, andImage/Evidence Examination, forensic investigators must be able to work with different disk image formats. TheE01 format(Expert Witness Format) is widely used in digital forensics because it supports compression, metadata storage, and integrity verification through hashing. However, many Linux-based forensic tools require the image to be mounted or accessed in araw (dd) formatfor direct analysis.

ewfmountis a Linux utility from thelibewftoolkit that allows investigators tomount E01 (and other EWF) images as raw disk images. Once mounted, the image appears as a raw device, enabling investigators to analyze partitions, file systems, and artifacts using standard forensic tools without altering the original evidence. This approach preserves forensic integrity and aligns with CHFI v11 best practices.

Autopsy (Option B) is a forensic analysis platform but does not perform E01-to-raw mounting itself. UFS Explorer (Option C) is a commercial forensic tool used for file system analysis, not image conversion. fdisk (Option D) is a disk partitioning utility and cannot mount or convert forensic image formats.

The CHFI Exam Blueprint v4 emphasizes properforensic image handling, validation, and analysis on Linux systems, makingewfmountthe correct, forensically sound, and exam-aligned tool for converting and mounting E01 images

According to the CHFI v11 objectives underWeb Application ForensicsandLog Analysis, investigators must know the default log storage locations of commonly used web servers. OnWindows-based systems,Internet Information Services (IIS)stores its web server logs within theinetpubdirectory, which resides on the system drive by default. The standard path used by IIS for logging HTTP and HTTPS requests is:

%SystemDrive%\inetpub\logs\LogFiles

In this question, the option %SystemDrive%\inetpub correctly points to the parent directory that contains IIS-related content, including theLogFilesdirectory where forensic-relevant web access logs are stored. These logs record critical details such as client IP addresses, request methods, requested URLs, HTTP status codes, timestamps, and user agents—key artifacts for reconstructing web-based attacks such as SQL injection, directory traversal, brute-force attempts, and malicious file uploads.

The other options are incorrect because they referenceApache web server configuration filesused on Linux or UNIX systems, not IIS. Since the server in question is Windows-based and running IIS, those paths are irrelevant to the investigation.

The CHFI Exam Blueprint v4 explicitly includesIIS web server architecture and log analysis, emphasizing familiarity with default IIS log locations as essential for effective web attack investigations and evidence collection, making Option D the correct and exam-aligned answer

According to the CHFI v11 objectives underEmail ForensicsandDigital Evidence Examination, investigators must be capable of extracting, converting, and analyzing email data stored in proprietary or corrupt formats. Microsoft Outlook commonly stores mailbox data inOST (Offline Storage Table)files, which can become inaccessible or corrupt during incidents such as system crashes, insider attacks, or malware infections.

Kernel for OST to PSTis a specialized forensic and eDiscovery tool designed to recover and convert OST files into accessible formats such asPST, EML, MSG, and MBOX. Its ability to export emails intoEML formatis particularly important in forensic investigations, as EML is widely supported by multiple forensic tools and email analysis platforms. CHFI v11 highlights the importance of using reliable tools that supportselective extraction, filtering, and migration, allowing investigators to isolate relevant emails, attachments, headers, and metadata while maintaining evidence integrity.

Additionally, Kernel for OST to PST supportsmigration to various email servers and web-based platforms, aligning with CHFI requirements for handling enterprise email evidence across heterogeneous environments.

The other options are unsuitable: Email Checker and ZeroBounce are email validation tools, and EmailSherlock focuses on email address investigation rather than mailbox data extraction.

Therefore, consistent with CHFI v11 best practices foremail evidence acquisition and conversion,Kernel for OST to PSTis the correct and exam-aligned answer

According to the CHFI v11 objectives underMobile and IoT ForensicsandOperating System Forensics, mobile devices often act ascross-platform interaction points, storing artifacts related to communications, file transfers, backups, or synchronization withWindows and Linux systems. These artifacts may include shared documents, SSH keys, SMB access traces, USB connection records, cloud sync remnants, or application logs indicating interaction with external operating systems.

A crucial forensic step in such cases isanalyzing files to identify interactions and potential evidence across different operating systems. This enables investigators to reconstruct user activity beyond the mobile device itself and establish links between the mobile device and other systems involved in the incident. CHFI v11 emphasizes the importance ofcorrelating evidence across heterogeneous platformsto build a complete and accurate timeline of events.

Focusing only on native mobile files (Options B and C) risks overlooking critical evidence that may demonstrate lateral movement, data exfiltration, or coordination between devices. Ignoring Windows- or Linux-related artifacts (Option D) directly contradicts forensic best practices and may lead to incomplete or flawed conclusions.

The CHFI Exam Blueprint v4 explicitly highlightsAndroid and iOS forensic analysis,cross-platform evidence correlation, andfile system analysisas key competencies. Therefore, analyzing cross-OS artifacts is essential for uncovering hidden relationships, validating investigative hypotheses, and ensuring legally defensible findings, making Option A the correct and exam-aligned answer

This question aligns with CHFI v11 objectives underMalware ForensicsandStatic Malware Analysis of Suspicious Documents. When analyzing potentially malicious Microsoft Office documents, CHFI v11 emphasizes that investigators shouldalways begin with static analysisbefore attempting any form of execution. This approach minimizes risk and helps identify embedded threats such as VBA macros, OLE objects, exploits, and obfuscation techniques without activating the payload.

Theoleidtool (part of the oletools suite) is specifically designed for theinitial inspection of OLE-based Microsoft Office documents. It quickly identifies indicators of compromise such as the presence of macros, embedded objects, suspicious file formats, encryption, and known exploit characteristics. CHFI v11 highlights oleid as a safe, non-intrusive first step to triage Office documents and determine whether deeper analysis (e.g., macro extraction or sandbox execution) is warranted.

Opening the document in a sandbox is adynamic analysis stepand should only occur after static indicators confirm malicious intent. The other options are either non-standard or insufficient for detecting embedded macro-based malware. Therefore, consistent with CHFI v11 malware forensics methodology, executingoleidto review suspicious components is the correct initial step.