DOP-C02 Exam Dumps - Amazon Web Services AWS Certified Professional Questions and Answers

When using the awslogs log driver with ECS on EC2, the ECS agent running on the container instance uses the instance’s IAM role (container instance role or task execution role, depending on configuration) to write logs to CloudWatch Logs. The policy already grants logs:CreateLogGroup , logs:CreateLogStream , and logs:PutLogEvents , which are the required CloudWatch Logs actions. However, for the role to be usable by ECS, the role’s trust policy must allow the appropriate service principal to assume it.

In this question, the error message indicates “missing permission” during ECS task deployment. If the IAM role is not trusted by the ECS service (for example, ecs-tasks.amazonaws.com for a task execution role or the proper principal for container instances), ECS cannot assume that role and therefore cannot use the granted CloudWatch permissions, causing deployment failures.

Option A addresses this by adding a trust relationship so that Amazon ECS can assume the IAM role. Options B and C mutate the permissions but do not fix the underlying problem: the missing trust. Option D incorrectly attempts to trust CloudWatch, which does not assume roles in this context.

Thus, adding a trust policy that establishes ECS as a trusted service is the correct fix.

 Stack Export and Import:

Use the Export feature in CloudFormation to share outputs from one stack (e.g., database resources) and use them as inputs in another stack (e.g., web application resources).

 Steps to Create Stack Export:

Define the resources in the database CloudFormation template and use the Outputs section to export necessary values.

Outputs:

DBInstanceEndpoint:

Value: !GetAtt DBInstance.Endpoint.Address

Export:

Name: DBInstanceEndpoint

Steps to Import into Web Application Stack:

In the web application CloudFormation template, use the ImportValue function to import these exported values.

Resources:

MyResource:

Type: " AWS::SomeResourceType "

Properties:

SomeProperty: !ImportValue DBInstanceEndpoint

Resource-Level Change-Set Reviews:

Both teams can continue using their respective review processes, as changes to each stack are managed independently.

Use CloudFormation change sets to preview changes before deploying.

By exporting resources from the database stack and importing them into the web application stack, both teams can maintain their separate review and lifecycle management processes while sharing necessary resources.

The correct answer is C. Updating the SCP in the child OU to allow all actions for Amazon EC2 will enable the DevOps engineer to launch the EC2 instance in the vendor-data account. SCPs are applied to OUs and accounts in a hierarchical manner, meaning that the SCPs attached to the parent OU are inherited by the child OU and accounts. Therefore, the SCP in the child OU overrides the SCP in the root OU and denies all actions except for DynamoDB and Lambda. By adding EC2 to the allowed actions in the child OU’s SCP, the DevOps engineer can access EC2 resources in the vendor-data account.

Option A is incorrect because attaching the AmazonEC2FullAccess IAM policy to the IAM user will not grant the user access to EC2 resources. IAM policies are evaluated after SCPs, so even if the IAM policy allows EC2 actions, the SCP will still deny them.

Option B is incorrect because creating a new SCP that allows all actions for EC2 and attaching it to the vendor-data account will not work. SCPs are not cumulative, meaning that only one SCP is applied to an account at a time. The SCP attached to the account will be the SCP attached to the OU that contains the account. Therefore, option B will not change the SCP that is applied to the vendor-data account.

Option D is incorrect because creating a new SCP that allows all actions for EC2 and attaching it to the root OU will not work. As explained earlier, the SCP in the child OU overrides the SCP in the root OU and denies all actions except for DynamoDB and Lambda. Therefore, option D will not affect the SCP that is applied to the vendor-data account.

https://docs.aws.amazon.com/IAM/latest/UserGuide/reference_policies_examples_aws_deny-ip.html

To meet the requirements, the DevOps engineer needs to configure the CloudWatch alarm to stop the EC2 instances when the average of the NetworkPacketsIn metric is less than 5 for at least 3 hours in a 12-hour time window. This means that the alarm should trigger when 3 out of 12 datapoints are below the threshold of 5. The alarm should also treat missing data as not breaching the threshold, so that the EC2 instances continue to run if there is no data for the metric during the evaluation period. The DevOps engineer can add an EC2 action to stop the instance when the alarm enters the ALARM state, which is a built-in action type for CloudWatch alarms.

Step 1: Storing Docker Images in Amazon ECRDocker images can be large, and storing them in a centralized, scalable location can greatly reduce build times. Amazon Elastic Container Registry (ECR) is a fully managed container registry that stores, manages, and deploys Docker container images.

Action: Store the Docker images in an ECR repository.

Why: Storing Docker images in ECR ensures that Docker images can be reused across multiple builds, improving build performance by avoiding the need to rebuild the images from scratch.

This is a classic AWS Organizations governance design:

Restrict Regions and allowed services across all accounts

The correct Organizations mechanism for account-wide guardrails is a Service Control Policy (SCP) .

SCPs set the maximum permissions that accounts/OUs can use, making them the right tool to enforce “only these Regions” and “only these services” consistently across the org.

Authentication from Active Directory + consistent job-function roles in every account

With AD as the identity source, the standard approach is federation to AWS using an IAM identity provider (SAML) and role assumption based on job function.

AWS CloudFormation StackSets is the operationally efficient way to deploy identical IAM roles/policies into multiple accounts/OUs so job-function permissions are consistent everywhere.

The roles’ trust policies can be configured to allow federated identities (from the AD-backed IdP) to assume the correct job role in each account.

Why the other options don’t fit:

A “OU with group policies” isn’t an AWS Organizations control mechanism for restricting Regions/services. The AWS-native control for this is SCPs , not “group policies.”

B Permissions boundaries are useful to limit what an IAM principal/role can do within an account , but they are not the org-wide enforcement mechanism for “all accounts must stay in these Regions / use only these services.” That’s what SCPs do.

C AWS RAM is for sharing resources (like subnets, Transit Gateway, etc.), not for “sharing roles” across accounts as a governance baseline. Also, the question emphasizes identical permissions in each account, which is best achieved by provisioning roles in each account (StackSets), not attempting to “share” roles.

Accessing a secret from AWS Secrets Manager that is encrypted with a customer managed KMS key requires two distinct permission layers to succeed:

Secrets Manager permissions (via IAM) such as secretsmanager:GetSecretValue for the IAM role assumed by the Kubernetes service account.

KMS key usage permissions in the KMS key policy , allowing the same IAM principal to perform kms:Decrypt (and possibly kms:GenerateDataKey ) on the customer managed key.

In this scenario, the service account assumes an IAM role explicitly created to access the secrets. The symptom is an HTTP 403 “Access Denied” when retrieving the secret. If the IAM role has Secrets Manager permissions but the call still fails, the typical root cause is that the KMS key policy does not trust or allow that IAM role , so the decrypt operation fails.

Option B correctly identifies that the KMS key policy must include the Kubernetes service account IAM role as a principal with the appropriate KMS actions.

Option A and C refer to the EKS cluster IAM role, which is not the principal making the call. Option D is unrelated: the role’s ability to “access the EKS cluster” does not affect its ability to call Secrets Manager or KMS. The missing KMS key policy permission is the underlying cause.

Amazon ECR supports enhanced scanning powered by Amazon Inspector, which provides deeper security scanning for container images including OS and programming language package vulnerabilities.

Enabling enhanced scanning (Option B) allows detection of CRITICAL and HIGH vulnerabilities.

Amazon ECR emits scan completion events via EventBridge, which can trigger Lambda functions. The Lambda function can process the scan results from Amazon Inspector and programmatically approve or reject the image in the CI/CD pipeline (Option D).

Basic scanning (Option A) is limited and does not integrate with Inspector.

Options C and E describe functionalities not natively supported (ECR does not automatically submit Rejected status; Clair is not used in AWS ECR scanning).

AWS Organizations is a service that helps to manage multiple AWS accounts. AWS Control Tower is a service that makes it easy to set up and govern secure, compliant multi-account AWS environments. Account Factory for Terraform (AFT) is an AWS Control Tower feature that provisions new accounts using Terraform templates. To provision new accounts with the Enterprise Support plan, the DevOps engineer can set the aft_feature_enterprise_support feature flag to True in the AFT deployment input configuration. This flag enables the Enterprise Support plan for newly provisioned accounts.

https://docs.aws.amazon.com/controltower/latest/userguide/aft-feature-options.html