DOP-C02 Exam Dumps - Amazon Web Services AWS Certified Professional Questions and Answers

AWS Config’s ec2-instance-profile-attached managed rule checks for attached instance profiles.

Config supports automatic remediation via Systems Manager Automation runbooks.

This provides continuous compliance with minimal operational overhead.

EventBridge and Lambda (A) require custom coding and risk missing existing instances.

StartInstances (C) does not cover RunInstances and new instances.

IAM-role managed policy check (D) does not check instance profile attachments.

Mutual TLS (mTLS) authentication requires two-way authentication between the client and the server. For Amazon API Gateway, you can enable mTLS for a custom domain name, which requires clients to present X.509 certificates to verify their identity to access your API. To set up mTLS, you would typically use AWS Certificate Manager (ACM) to create a private certificate authority (CA) and provision a client certificate signed by this private CA. The root CA certificate is then uploaded to an Amazon S3 bucket and configured in API Gateway as the trust store12.

Introducing mutual TLS authentication for Amazon API Gateway1.

Configuring mutual TLS authentication for a REST API2.

AWS Private Certificate Authority details3.

AWS Certificate Manager Private Certificate Authority updates4.

The requirement is classic attribute-based access control (ABAC): users should only access EC2 resources whose resource tag matches the user’s department attribute coming from IAM Identity Center (mapped into a principal/session tag like aws:PrincipalTag/department).

For EC2 resource authorization using tags, the correct pattern is to compare the EC2 resource tag condition key ec2:ResourceTag/department to the principal tag ${aws:PrincipalTag/department}. That is exactly what Option C does.

Why the other options are wrong:

A only checks that the tag key exists (aws:TagKeys) and does not enforce a match between user department and instance department.

B uses aws:ResourceTag/... rather than the EC2-specific tag key typically used for EC2 authorization decisions in EC2 actions (ec2:ResourceTag/...).

D restricts access to resources tagged as d1/d2/d3 but does not ensure the user can only access their own department.

Option B is the only choice that directly satisfies both requirements:

Continuously evaluate the account-level S3 Block Public Access setting

AWS Config is designed to record configuration state and evaluate resources/settings against rules over time.

A Config rule (managed rule) can check whether the account-level “S3 Block Public Access” settings are configured as required (i.e., blocking public access).

Automatically revert drift (auto-remediate) if someone changes the setting later

AWS Config Remediation can automatically trigger an AWS Systems Manager Automation runbook when the rule becomes NON_COMPLIANT.

Using an SSM Automation document/runbook that sets S3 account-level Block Public Access back to the required “blocked” configuration ensures that any future change is corrected automatically, restoring compliance without manual intervention.

Why the other options don’t fully meet the requirement:

A (Security Hub): Security Hub primarily aggregates findings and checks controls. While it can integrate with automation, AWS Config is the standard service for configuration drift detection + automatic remediation loops for account-level posture settings. Security Hub is not the most direct “detect config drift and auto-fix” mechanism for an account setting in the way Config remediation is.

C (SCP): An SCP can restrict API actions, but it doesn’t “revert” a changed S3 Block Public Access configuration; it only prevents/limits what actions can be called. Also, “deny S3 actions from outside the account” is not the same as enforcing Block Public Access settings at the account level.

D (Macie + EventBridge): Macie focuses on data discovery and sensitive data findings, not enforcing or continuously remediating S3 account-level Block Public Access configuration drift. Triggering remediation off Macie findings is indirect and not aligned to “setting changed → immediately revert.”

Short Explanation: To meet the requirements, the DevOps engineer should update the SAML assertion to pass the user’s team name, update the IAM role’s trust policy to add an access-team session tag that has the team name, create an IAM permissions boundary in each account, and for each CodeCommit repository, add an access-team tag that has the value set to the name of the associated team.

Updating the SAML assertion to pass the user’s team name allows the DevOps engineer to use IAM tags to identify which team a user belongs to. This can help enforce fine-grained access control based on the user’s team membership1.

Updating the IAM role’s trust policy to add an access-team session tag that has the team name allows the DevOps engineer to use IAM condition keys to restrict access based on the session tag value2. For example, the DevOps engineer can use the aws:PrincipalTag condition key to match the access-team tag of the user with the access-team tag of the repository3.

Creating an IAM permissions boundary in each account allows the DevOps engineer to set the maximum permissions that an identity-based policy can grant to an IAM entity. An entity’s permissions boundary allows it to perform only the actions that are allowed by both its identity-based policies and its permissions boundaries4. For example, the DevOps engineer can use a permissions boundary policy to limit the actions that a user can perform on CodeCommit repositories based on their access-team tag5.

For each CodeCommit repository, adding an access-team tag that has the value set to the name of the associated team allows the DevOps engineer to use resource tags to identify which team manages a repository. This can help enforce fine-grained access control based on the resource tag value6.

The other options are incorrect because:

Creating an approval rule template for each team in the Organizations management account is not a valid option, as approval rule templates are not supported by AWS Organizations. Approval rule templates are specific to CodeCommit and can only be associated with one or more repositories in the same AWS Region where they are created7.

Creating an approval rule template for each account is not a valid option, as approval rule templates are not designed to restrict access to modify branches. Approval rule templates are designed to require approvals from specified users or groups before merging pull requests8.

Attaching an SCP to the accounts is not a valid option, as SCPs are not designed to restrict access based on tags. SCPs are designed to restrict access based on service actions and resources across all users and roles in an organization’s account9.

The Auto Scaling group service-linked role must have a specific grant in the source account in order to decrypt the encrypted AMI. This is because the service-linked role does not have permissions to assume the default IAM role in the source account.

The following steps are required to meet the requirements:

In the source account, copy the unencrypted AMI to an encrypted AMI. Specify the KMS key in the copy action.

In the source account, create a KMS grant that delegates permissions to the Auto Scaling group service-linked role in the target account.

In the source account, share the encrypted AMI with the target account.

In the target account, attach the KMS grant to the Auto Scaling group service-linked role.

The first three steps are the same as the steps that I described earlier. The fourth step is required to grant the Auto Scaling group service-linked role permissions to decrypt the AMI in the target account.

AWS Systems Manager Patch Manager automates patch scanning and installation. Integrating with AWS Config enables compliance reporting and auto-remediation. This provides centralized patch compliance management per AWS Ops best practices.

You need to understand how SCP inheritance works in AWS. The way it works for Deny policies is different that allow policies.

Allow polices are passing down to children ONLY if they don't have an allow policy.

Deny policies always pass down to children.

That's why there is always an SCP set to the Root to allow everything by default. If you limit this policy, the whole organization will be limited, not matter what other policies are saying for the other OUs. So it's not A. It's not D because it restricts the wrong OU.