312-50v13 Exam Dumps - ECCouncil CEH v13 Questions and Answers

This scenario primarily simulates dumpster diving because the key action involves retrieving sensitive information from discarded materials and then using it to gain access. In CEH social engineering coverage, dumpster diving is a physical information-gathering technique where an attacker searches trash, recycling bins, unsecured disposal containers, or shredding waste to find documents and artifacts that can be exploited. Common targets include access codes, employee directories, printed emails, shipping labels, invoices, internal memos, and partially shredded documents—exactly what Priya finds in the unsecured maintenance container. The question even emphasizes “discarded packaging,” “shipping labels,” “shredded office material,” and a “crumpled document listing temporary access codes,” which are classic dumpster-diving indicators.

The later use of recovered access codes to enter the break room is the impact of the dumpster-diving phase, but the primary social engineering technique tested is how improper disposal leads to compromise. Tailgating would involve following an authorized person through a secure door without proper authentication. Eavesdropping refers to listening in on conversations or communications to capture sensitive information. Shoulder surfing involves visually observing someone’s screen or keyboard while they enter credentials or view confidential data. None of those describe the initial method of obtaining the access codes.

CEH-aligned mitigations include enforcing clean-desk and secure disposal policies, using locked disposal bins, shredding sensitive documents properly with secure destruction processes, training staff on handling printed data, and restricting access to loading docks and waste areas. Regular audits of disposal practices and physical security checks reduce the likelihood that attackers can harvest usable access details from trash.

SHA-256 is a cryptographic hash function, and CEH v13 clearly states that hash functions alone provide data integrity, but not authenticity or non-repudiation. If attackers can modify data and recompute the hash, integrity checks will still pass.

The issue arises because SHA-256 does not prove who created or modified the data. To address this weakness, CEH v13 recommends using digital signatures, which combine hashing with asymmetric cryptography. A digital signature ensures:

Integrity (data has not changed)

Authentication (data was signed by a known entity)

Non-repudiation (the signer cannot deny the action)

Digital signatures work by hashing the data and encrypting the hash with the sender’s private key. Any modification to the data invalidates the signature.

Encryption alone (Options A and C) protects confidentiality, not integrity or authenticity. SSL/TLS (Option B) secures data in transit but does not protect stored data from tampering.

CEH v13 explicitly identifies digital signatures as the correct cryptographic control when integrity mechanisms alone are insufficient. Therefore, Option D is correct.

The ntpq utility provides detailed NTP peer information, synchronization states, offsets, delays, and strata. CEH specifically lists ntpq as the tool for querying NTP daemon status and enumerating peer relationships, making it essential for reconnaissance and lateral movement mapping.

This technique is known as Boolean-Based Blind SQL Injection, as defined in CEH v13 Web Application Hacking. When applications suppress database errors and return generic responses, attackers use conditional statements to infer database behavior.

By comparing responses to true (1=1) and false (1=2) conditions, the attacker deduces whether injected SQL is being executed successfully.

CEH v13 distinguishes this from:

Error-based SQLi (visible DB errors)

UNION-based SQLi (data extraction)

Time-based SQLi (response delays)

Boolean-based blind SQL injection relies solely on content differences, making option C correct.

In CEH v13 Cloud Computing, serverless architectures introduce unique security challenges, particularly around Function-as-a-Service (FaaS) permissions. When a serverless function is compromised through an insecure third-party API, the damage depends largely on what the function is allowed to do.

Implementing function-level permission models and enforcing the principle of least privilege ensures that even if a function is exploited, its ability to execute malicious actions is strictly limited. CEH v13 strongly emphasizes granular IAM controls in serverless environments.

While cloud-native security platforms (Option A) and CASBs (Option C) provide visibility and governance, they do not directly prevent excessive permissions. Regular patching (Option D) is important but does not mitigate permission abuse.

CEH v13 identifies least privilege as the single most critical control in preventing serverless abuse and privilege escalation. Therefore, Option B is the correct answer.

According to the CEH Network Scanning module, Idle Scanning (Zombie Scanning) is one of the most stealthy reconnaissance techniques. In this method, the attacker uses an idle third-party host (zombie) to probe the target indirectly.

Because all scan packets appear to originate from the zombie system, the true attacker remains hidden. CEH highlights that idle scans:

Are extremely stealthy

Generate minimal traffic from the attacker

Make attribution very difficult

Option B is correct.

Option A (FIN scan) is stealthy but still traceable.

Option C is noisy and easily detected.

Option D describes a Xmas scan, which is detectable.

CEH classifies idle scanning as one of the hardest scanning techniques to trace.

CEH materials describe RDDoS (Ransom DDoS) attacks as threat-driven extortion campaigns where attackers demand payment and demonstrate capability by launching a short-lived DDoS burst. The purpose is to intimidate the victim into paying before a larger, sustained attack begins. The attack described uses HTTP floods with incomplete POST requests—an application-layer DDoS technique that consumes server resources by forcing the target to hold open connections. This kind of demonstration followed by an extortion email aligns precisely with RDDoS behavior. DRDoS attacks involve reflection/amplification through third-party servers, which is not occurring here. Pulse wave attacks use timed bursts and do not involve extortion, while recursive GET floods do not match the incomplete POST behavior. Therefore, the correct classification is RDDoS.

CEH v13 explains that WPA3 introduces SAE (Simultaneous Authentication of Equals), which resists traditional offline dictionary and brute-force attacks by removing crackable handshake material. Because WPA3 prevents attackers from capturing a reusable handshake, the most practical offensive method is to force a downgrade attack, tricking clients into associating using WPA2 instead of WPA3. Once the victim reconnects under WPA2-PSK, the attacker captures the standard 4-way handshake, which can then be cracked offline using dictionary or GPU-accelerated brute-force methods. CEH discusses downgrade attacks as a significant real-world threat when mixed-mode configurations are enabled or when access points fail to enforce strict WPA3-only operation. Options B and C are ineffective because WPA3 handshake materials cannot be brute-forced offline. Option D is unrelated to Wi-Fi encryption. Downgrading to WPA2 is the most effective and widely documented attack path.

In CEH v13 Mobile, IoT, and OT Hacking, firmware-level attacks on Programmable Logic Controllers (PLCs) are categorized as high-impact and stealth-oriented threats, often designed to evade traditional network-based defenses. Malicious firmware compromises the integrity of the device itself, allowing attackers persistent and covert control over industrial processes.

The first and most critical step is to verify the integrity of the firmware and software running on the PLCs. CEH v13 emphasizes that before containment or mitigation actions are applied, accurate identification and confirmation of compromise must occur. Firmware inspection enables analysts to detect unauthorized code injections, modified logic blocks, altered checksums, or tampered boot loaders—hallmarks of OT malware such as Stuxnet-like attacks.

Immediate isolation (Option A) may be necessary later, but premature isolation can disrupt industrial operations and destroy volatile forensic evidence. IDS enhancements (Option C) focus on traffic patterns and are ineffective against firmware-resident malware. Restricting remote access (Option D) is preventative but does not validate or remove an existing firmware compromise.

CEH v13 stresses that OT environments require forensic verification at the device level, especially when abnormal behavior originates from controllers themselves. Firmware validation using vendor-approved tools and hash verification is the correct first step to confirm compromise and plan remediation without risking operational safety.

This question relates to Malware Analysis, specifically PDF-based malware, as covered in the CEH v13 Malware Threats module. The presence of /JavaScript and /OpenAction keywords identified by pdfid strongly indicates potentially malicious behavior triggered when the PDF is opened.

CEH v13 recommends static analysis of PDF stream objects as the next step to understand embedded malicious logic. Tools such as PDFStreamDumper allow analysts to extract, decompress, and inspect object streams within a PDF file, revealing obfuscated JavaScript code or exploit payloads.

The /OpenAction keyword indicates that the embedded JavaScript executes automatically when the document is opened, a common technique used in PDF-based attacks to exploit reader vulnerabilities or download secondary payloads.

Other options are insufficient:

VirusTotal provides detection results but not behavioral insight.

PE Explorer is irrelevant because PDFs are not Portable Executable files.

Hashing only helps identify known malware, not analyze behavior.

CEH v13 emphasizes manual inspection of embedded scripts to determine intent, making PDFStreamDumper the correct next step.

The Certified Ethical Hacker (CEH) Cloud Computing module emphasizes that serverless environments rely heavily on granular permission models. Attacks involving compromised APIs often succeed because functions are granted excessive privileges.

Option D is correct because enforcing function-level permissions and the principle of least privilege directly limits what a compromised function can execute. CEH documentation states this is the primary defense against serverless abuse.

Option A is beneficial but reactive.

Option B focuses on SaaS governance rather than FaaS execution control.

Option C provides visibility but does not directly prevent privilege misuse.

CEH highlights identity and access management (IAM) as critical in serverless security.

Comprehensive Explanation from CEH v13 Courseware:

CEH v13 describes Firewalking as a reconnaissance technique designed to determine which layer-4 protocols and ports a firewall allows. The attacker sends packets with carefully adjusted TTL values so that the packet expires just beyond the firewall. If the next hop generates ICMP Time Exceeded responses, the attacker can infer which ports the firewall permits. This method mimics normal TTL behavior, making it stealthier than full SYN scans or high-noise probing. Firewalking is expressly highlighted in CEH as a low-profile way to map firewall ACLs without triggering alarms. Broadcast pings are noisy and detectable, passive DNS monitoring does not reveal firewall rule sets, and full SYN scans are easily flagged by IDS systems. Firewalking’s reliance on TTL behavior, combined with protocol-specific probes, makes it the correct and CEH-aligned technique for quietly discovering open ports and firewall filtering rules.

The correct answer is A. Creepy because the task is specifically about extracting and analyzing geolocation information (geotags) from publicly shared media and mapping that data to real-world locations to infer employee movement patterns. In CEH-aligned reconnaissance/OSINT workflows, geolocation intelligence is a common element of footprinting because it can reveal sensitive operational details such as office locations, travel routines, meeting venues, home addresses, and patterns of presence/absence. Tools designed for geolocation OSINT help testers identify whether staff are unintentionally exposing location metadata through social media posts, uploaded photos, or other public sources.

Creepy is purpose-built for geolocation reconnaissance: it collects location metadata associated with content and presents results in a way that supports mapping and timeline-style analysis, helping analysts correlate people, posts, and coordinates. This directly supports the goal of evaluating whether employees are disclosing sensitive information about office routines by publishing geotagged images. When used in an authorized assessment, such tooling helps demonstrate risk in a measurable way—for example, showing clusters of posts around a specific building, repeated visits at predictable times, or regular travel routes that could support surveillance, targeted social engineering, or physical intrusion planning.

Why the other options are less suitable: Social Searcher is primarily used for monitoring and searching social media content by keywords, usernames, hashtags, and mentions; it is useful for broad OSINT collection but is not specifically focused on geotag extraction and movement mapping. Sherlock is designed to find a username across many platforms, helping link identities, but it does not specialize in geolocation mapping. Maltego is a powerful link-analysis platform that can correlate entities (people, domains, emails, social profiles) and can support OSINT investigations, but for the narrow requirement of extracting and mapping geotagged location data from media, Creepy is the most direct and purpose-specific tool.

Therefore, the best tool for this geotagged image movement analysis task is Creepy.

The correct answer is A. Call Spoofing because the defining behavior in the scenario is manipulating the caller ID information so that the victim’s phone displays a trusted number—specifically, the credit union’s official line. In CEH-aligned social engineering and mobile attack discussions, call spoofing is a technique where an attacker falsifies caller ID data to impersonate a legitimate organization, department, or known contact. This increases credibility and exploits human trust in recognized numbers, making victims more likely to comply with sensitive requests such as disclosing usernames, passwords, or one-time codes.

The attack is also a form of vishing (voice phishing), where the attacker uses phone calls and persuasive pretexts (“mandatory security check”) to trick employees into revealing credentials. The success factor here is the authority and legitimacy signal created by the spoofed number. When staff see what appears to be an official institutional phone number, they are more likely to assume the call is authentic and bypass normal verification steps, especially under time pressure or when framed as a security requirement.

Why the other options are incorrect: OTP hijacking refers to stealing or intercepting one-time passwords (for example via SIM swap, malware, or social engineering focused specifically on MFA/OTP codes). While the attacker could ask for OTPs, the scenario’s core mechanism is the spoofed caller ID, not OTP interception. Bluebugging is a Bluetooth-based attack that gains unauthorized control over a device through Bluetooth vulnerabilities; it is unrelated to caller ID impersonation. SMiShing is phishing via SMS/text messages, not a voice call.

Therefore, the mobile attack vector demonstrated—displaying a trusted institutional number to deceive employees during a credential-harvesting call—is call spoofing.

The observed behavior most closely matches the Digital Signature Algorithm (DSA). The strongest indicators are: (1) a fresh random value is generated for each signature operation, and (2) the math operates in a subgroup defined by public domain parameters using modular arithmetic, and (3) signatures are verified using a public verification key, not by “decrypting” the message.

DSA is a signature-only asymmetric algorithm derived from discrete logarithm principles. It uses public domain parameters commonly represented as (p, q, g), where p is a large prime, q is a prime divisor of p−1, and g is a generator of a subgroup of order q. For each signature, DSA requires a unique per-message secret random number k. This ephemeral k is crucial: reusing it (or generating it predictably) can expose the private key. The scenario’s emphasis on “fresh random value for each signature operation” aligns directly with this core DSA requirement.

By contrast, RSA signatures can be implemented in different ways (often involving modular exponentiation with padding) and do not inherently require a fresh random per-signature secret like DSA’s k (although some padding schemes may involve randomness). Diffie-Hellman is primarily a key exchange algorithm, not a signing algorithm. ElGamal can be used for signatures and also uses randomness, but the mention of “subgroup defined by public domain parameters” and the classic per-signature random value requirement most strongly aligns with the standard description of DSA used in many security curricula and assessments.

Therefore, based on the signature process characteristics described, the best match is A. DSA.