312-50v13 Exam Dumps - ECCouncil CEH v13 Questions and Answers

The correct answer is D. Application Keylogger because the scenario describes keystroke capture from desktop applications on a Windows workstation without installing kernel drivers and without requiring physical access or browser-level script injection. In CEH-aligned keylogger classifications, an application (user-mode) keylogger operates at the application layer by using user-space techniques such as hooking common Windows APIs (for example, keyboard input functions and message-handling routines) to intercept keystrokes as they are processed by applications. This enables logging of credentials typed into local programs, draft emails written in desktop clients, and sensitive text entered into business tools—exactly the outcome Tyler observed.

The question provides two strong eliminators. First, it states no kernel drivers were installed, which rules out kernel keyloggers that capture input at the kernel level (often requiring driver installation and deeper OS integration). Second, it states the attack did not require browser injection, which rules out a JavaScript keylogger (typically implemented by injecting script into a web page/application to capture form inputs within a browser session). It also explicitly notes that there was no physical device access, which rules out a hardware keylogger (a physical device placed between keyboard and computer or embedded in a keyboard) that requires in-person installation.

Application keyloggers are frequently used in post-exploitation because they can be deployed quickly with standard user-level privileges (though higher privileges may expand coverage), can target a broad range of applications, and can run covertly. From a defense perspective, monitoring for suspicious API hooking behavior, unusual process injection, abnormal input-capture patterns, and endpoint controls that detect credential access techniques are common countermeasures.

Therefore, given the constraints and the observed logging of desktop application input, the most likely keylogger type is an application keylogger.

The correct answer is IMDS Attack. CEH cloud security material explains that cloud instances often obtain temporary credentials from an Instance Metadata Service, commonly called IMDS, which supplies identity and role-based access details to workloads running on the virtual machine. If an attacker gains code execution on the instance, even through a separate web application flaw, the attacker may query the metadata endpoint locally and retrieve temporary credentials associated with the instance role. That is precisely what happens in this scenario: the tester runs a script on the VM, extracts temporary role credentials, and then uses them to enumerate storage and other services within the same cloud account. Wrapping attacks target SOAP message manipulation, while cloud snooper and CP DoS do not match the behavior of harvesting role credentials from local cloud metadata. CEH emphasizes that overprivileged instance roles and exposed metadata access can allow attackers to pivot from a single compromised workload into broader cloud service access. Because the key step is retrieving temporary credentials from the instance metadata service, the best match is IMDS Attack.

The correct answer is C. Whois lookup because the scenario describes retrieving publicly available domain registration records using an online service without directly interacting with the target organization’s infrastructure. In CEH-aligned reconnaissance (footprinting) techniques, WHOIS is a foundational passive information-gathering method used to identify details tied to a domain name, such as the registrant/organization, administrative and technical contacts, registration and expiration dates, and the authoritative name servers associated with the domain. These details are commonly used to establish ownership context, map the organization’s external footprint, and identify potential points of contact for administrative or security coordination.

The prompt emphasizes that the ethical hacker wants “details about the organization’s domain ownership” and “points of contact.” That is precisely the kind of information WHOIS is intended to provide. It also explicitly notes “without direct interaction with the target,” which aligns with WHOIS being passive: queries are made to registries/registrars or WHOIS aggregation services rather than probing the target’s servers.

Why the other options are less correct: Email footprinting focuses on collecting email addresses, formats, mail servers, and potentially related metadata, but it is not the primary method for domain ownership/registrant contact records. Network footprinting is broader and often involves identifying IP ranges, network blocks, technologies, and topology—potentially including active probing. DNS interrogation (such as querying A, MX, NS, TXT records) can reveal technical DNS data and infrastructure mapping, but it typically does not provide the domain’s registrant ownership details and formal contact records; that role is handled by WHOIS and registry data.

Therefore, the method most likely used here is a WHOIS lookup to obtain public domain registration and contact information.

The CEH IoT and APT Threat modules describe APT groups as highly skilled adversaries that favor stealth, persistence, and advanced exploitation techniques. IoT environments are particularly attractive due to:

Limited monitoring

Infrequent firmware updates

Weak or proprietary security mechanisms

CEH highlights that APT actors often exploit zero-day vulnerabilities in firmware to gain long-term, covert access to IoT systems. Firmware-level exploitation allows attackers to maintain persistence while evading traditional security controls.

Option C is correct.

Option A is noisy and short-term.

Option B is common but less sophisticated for APTs.

Option D is possible but secondary compared to firmware exploitation.

CEH emphasizes firmware security as a critical concern in IoT deployments.

CEH v13 defines a white hat hacker as a security professional who performs authorized assessments to identify vulnerabilities and strengthen an organization’s defenses. The defining characteristic of white hat activity is the presence of formal permission—typically through a signed rules-of-engagement, scope of work, and explicit authorization from the organization. CEH emphasizes that white hats adhere to legal boundaries, follow ethical guidelines, and document findings to support remediation. They may use the same tools and methodologies as malicious hackers, but the intent and authorization distinguish them. In contrast, black hats operate without permission and with malicious intent. Grey hats act without authorization but may not have malicious motivations, making them inappropriate in a formal penetration testing engagement. Script kiddies lack professional skill and rely on pre-made tools without understanding the underlying techniques. Therefore, the hacker described is a white hat—an ethical professional performing sanctioned testing.

Information Leakage is the most accurate threat category because the scenario centers on sensitive data becoming publicly accessible through unintended disclosure. In CEH coverage, information leakage refers to the exposure of confidential or internal details to unauthorized parties through oversharing, misconfiguration, poor operational security, or improper handling of information. Here, the data is already visible on public forums, meaning an attacker does not need to exploit a vulnerability in a system directly at first; they can simply collect and correlate exposed details such as employee names, email formats, internal hostnames, software versions, configuration snippets, IP ranges, or screenshots.

This aligns strongly with reconnaissance and OSINT techniques emphasized in CEH: adversaries routinely harvest publicly available information to build an attack plan, identify privileged targets, guess usernames, craft phishing lures, locate externally exposed services, or tailor further exploitation using revealed versions and settings. While social engineering can be a follow-on step, the core issue described is not persuading users to reveal information interactively. Instead, the organization’s risk stems from information already leaked due to careless online behavior.

Corporate espionage is a motive rather than a specific technique category, and system and network attacks describe active exploitation and intrusion attempts, which come after the intelligence-gathering stage. Therefore, to simulate the adversary’s method of gathering what has been exposed, Michael should focus on information leakage: identifying what is publicly disclosed, how it can be aggregated, and what attack paths it enables, then recommending containment and policy and awareness controls.

The CEH IDS/IPS Evasion module describes packet fragmentation as a common evasion technique used to bypass signature-based detection.

Option B is correct.

Other options represent different attack categories.

CEH highlights reassembly normalization as a countermeasure.

This scenario matches a session fixation attack because Michael sets up a valid session identifier with the application first, then forces the victim to authenticate while using that same pre-established session. In CEH terms, session fixation occurs when an attacker “fixes” or plants a known session ID in the victim’s browser, typically via a crafted URL parameter, cookie setting through a subdomain, or a redirect that preserves a session token. If the application does not regenerate the session ID after login, the victim’s authentication becomes bound to the attacker-known session. The attacker can then reuse that same session ID to access the application as the victim, exactly as described when Michael “uses that session to access the portal” after the employee logs in.

The other options do not fit the mechanism. Session sniffing relies on capturing session tokens from network traffic, usually when encryption is missing or weak, but the question focuses on a link and a pre-initialized session rather than intercepting traffic. Session replay generally refers to capturing and replaying authentication exchanges or tokens, not pre-setting a session before the victim authenticates. “Session donation” is not the standard CEH label for this behavior and is not the best match to the described flow.

CEH-recommended mitigations include regenerating session IDs immediately after authentication and privilege changes, rejecting session IDs supplied in URLs, setting Secure and HttpOnly cookie flags, enforcing SameSite where appropriate, implementing short idle timeouts, and adding server-side controls to detect concurrent use or abnormal session binding changes.

Android Debug Bridge (ADB) is a powerful debugging interface that, if misconfigured, allows attackers to execute commands remotely. CEH v13 identifies exposed ADB as a critical mobile security risk, especially in enterprise environments.

The most effective countermeasure is to disable ADB entirely, except when explicitly required for development or troubleshooting, and only within tightly controlled environments. This directly removes the attack vector.

VPNs and biometrics improve security but do not prevent ADB abuse. Updating MDM systems is important but does not eliminate the risk if ADB remains enabled.

CEH v13 explicitly recommends strict ADB control as a best practice. Therefore, Option C is the correct answer.

CEH v13 stresses the importance of passive reconnaissance when the goal is to avoid any interaction with the target’s systems. Job postings frequently reveal detailed information such as internal technologies, OS platforms, security tools, IDS brands, virtualization environments, scripting languages, and cloud services. CEH explicitly notes job ads as one of the richest passive intelligence sources because organizations inadvertently disclose their tech stack, often mentioning required experience with specific network components, databases, protocols, or internal tools. Options B and D involve direct interaction, violating the passive reconnaissance requirement. WHOIS lookups (Option C) provide DNS registrar information but do not reveal internal network details. Job postings, social media recruitment materials, and HR documentation are discussed in CEH as critical OSINT resources used during the footprinting phase to gather actionable intelligence while maintaining complete stealth. Thus, analyzing job postings is the correct method.

CEH clearly distinguishes between active and passive reconnaissance. Passive methods involve gathering publicly available data without directly interacting with the target’s infrastructure, thus avoiding detection. Tools such as Netcraft, DNSdumpster, VirusTotal, Certificate Transparency logs, and search engine indexing are recommended by CEH for discovering subdomains through public metadata, cached DNS records, WHOIS data, SSL certificate entries, and third-party enumeration databases. These platforms provide insights into externally accessible assets without sending packets or queries to the target organization. Brute-force enumeration is active and violates the rules of engagement. Attempting credential guessing or requesting internal DNS data are unauthorized and clearly active reconnaissance activities. Passive OSINT-based subdomain enumeration is a core CEH technique used to uncover hidden infrastructure safely and legally. It is especially crucial in red team operations where stealth is a priority.

The scenario describes user input being passed into system-level execution and causing “unintended operations at the system level,” which is the defining behavior of command injection in CEH web application hacking coverage. Command injection occurs when an application constructs or invokes operating system commands using unsanitized, user-controlled input. By inserting shell metacharacters or command separators such as ;, & & , |, or backticks, an attacker can cause the server to execute additional commands beyond what the developer intended. The impact often includes reading sensitive files, listing directories, creating users, downloading malware, pivoting, or otherwise interacting with restricted server resources, matching the prompt’s “access to restricted server resources.”

The question also rules out other injection families. LDAP injection targets directory service queries and manipulates LDAP filters, which the prompt explicitly excludes. CRLF injection involves inserting carriage return and line feed characters to manipulate HTTP headers or split responses; it does not primarily produce OS-level execution. “Shell Injection” is sometimes used informally to describe the same concept, but in CEH-style terminology and exam question patterns, the standard label for injecting into OS command execution is Command Injection, making option D the best and most precise answer.

Effective mitigations emphasized in CEH-aligned guidance include avoiding OS command calls where possible, using safe APIs that do not invoke shells, strict allowlisting and canonical validation of input, proper escaping for the target interpreter when needed, running services with least privilege, and applying segmentation and monitoring to limit blast radius.

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CEH v13 defines passive reconnaissance as information gathering without directly interacting with the target’s systems. Activities such as reviewing archived websites, social media, forums, and public records are all passive and legal.

Running an intensive port scan, however, is an active reconnaissance technique. According to CEH v13, port scanning directly interacts with target systems and can trigger IDS/IPS alerts, logs, and even legal consequences if done without authorization.

Therefore, option B violates the principles of passive reconnaissance and is the riskiest choice.

CEH v13 describes Agent Smith–style attacks as malicious Android operations where an app silently replaces legitimate applications by exploiting weaknesses in the Android app update and installation processes. These attacks often begin when users download seemingly innocent apps from untrusted third-party marketplaces. Once installed, the malicious application injects harmful code into other apps, overwriting them while preserving their icons and interface, allowing the attacker to harvest credentials, display ads, or maintain persistence without detection. CEH explains that this technique takes advantage of Android’s APK structure, sideloading vulnerabilities, and lack of signature validation in compromised environments. Simjacker (Option A) targets SIM toolkit vulnerabilities and does not replace apps. Man-in-the-Disk (Option B) abuses external storage operations but does not overwrite applications. Camfecting (Option D) refers to hijacking smartphone cameras. The described malicious replacement of legitimate apps exactly matches the Agent Smith attack pattern.

The technique described is RST hijacking because the attacker sends spoofed TCP packets with the RST (reset) flag to forcibly terminate established TCP sessions. In TCP, an RST packet is used to immediately abort a connection. If an attacker can craft packets that appear to belong to an existing session (matching the 4-tuple and using plausible sequence/acknowledgment values), the receiving endpoint may accept the reset and tear down the connection. This creates disruption—sessions drop, users are disconnected, and applications experience errors—without the attacker needing to fully take over the session or inject meaningful application data.

The scenario matches this exactly: “spoofed TCP packets carrying the reset flag,” followed by “active sessions…abruptly terminated.” That is the hallmark outcome of RST-based session disruption. It is often used as a demonstration of how fragile sessions can be when attackers can spoof traffic within a path (or on the same network segment) and when defensive controls do not validate or protect sessions adequately.

Why the other options are incorrect:

UDP hijacking (A) doesn’t apply because UDP is connectionless and has no RST flag or session teardown mechanism like TCP.

Blind hijacking (C) refers to injecting traffic without seeing responses (guessing sequence numbers), but the specific mechanism asked here is the reset-flag termination; “blind” could be a property of how it’s done, not the named technique.

TCP/IP hijacking (D) is a broader category that includes multiple methods of taking over or manipulating TCP sessions. The question is specifically about using RST packets to kill sessions, which is most precisely called RST hijacking.

Therefore, the correct answer is B. RST Hijacking.