ISA-IEC-62443 Exam Dumps - ISA Cybersecurity Questions and Answers

The four documents classified under the General category of ISA/IEC 62443 are:

Part 1-1: Terminology, concepts, and models

Part 1-2: Master glossary of terms and definitions

Part 1-3: System security conformance metrics

The asset model is used in ISA/IEC 62443 to represent and describe the relationships and dependencies between different assets in an IACS environment. This model helps organizations identify and document assets, their interconnections, and their significance for operational and cybersecurity purposes. The zone model builds upon the asset model for segmentation, but the asset model itself establishes the foundational relationships.

ISA/IEC TR 62443-1-5 provides formal guidance on the creation and structure of cybersecurity profiles within the ISA/IEC 62443 framework. A security profile is intended to tailor existing requirements to a specific industry sector, application, or use case without altering the integrity of the base standard.

Step 1: Purpose of a security profile

The technical report clarifies that profiles are selections and combinations of existing requirements, not a mechanism to invent new controls. Profiles ensure consistent application of ISA/IEC 62443 while addressing sector-specific risk, regulatory, or operational needs.

Step 2: Authorized source documents

TR 62443-1-5 explicitly states that security profiles may reference requirements from:

ISA/IEC 62443-2-1 (asset owner security program requirements)

ISA/IEC 62443-2-4 (service provider requirements)

ISA/IEC 62443-3-3 (system security requirements)

ISA/IEC 62443-4-1 (secure product development lifecycle)

ISA/IEC 62443-4-2 (technical component requirements)

These documents collectively cover organizational, system, and component security.

Step 3: Why other options are incorrect

Limiting profiles to only Parts 3-3 and 4-1 excludes governance and lifecycle requirements.

Parts 1-1 and 1-2 are foundational and definitional, not requirement sources.

Referencing standards outside the 62443 family violates the intent of maintaining internal consistency.

Step 4: Standard integrity

By restricting profiles to these documents, ISA ensures profiles remain interoperable, auditable, and certifiable.

Thus, Option C is the only correct answer.

ISA/IEC 62443-2-1 defines SP Element 4 as covering component hardening, malware protection, and the secure use of portable and mobile media. Malware introduced through USB devices is a well-known attack vector in IACS environments, and the standard addresses this risk explicitly through preventive controls rather than only reactive measures.

Step 1: Nature of the threat

Portable media such as USB drives bypass network-based defenses and can introduce malware directly into critical control systems. ISA/IEC 62443 recognizes this as a high-risk vector, especially in air-gapped or semi-isolated systems.

Step 2: SP Element 4 scope

SP Element 4 requires asset owners to implement technical controls such as:

Restrictions on the use of portable media

Use of dedicated, controlled media

Malware scanning before use

Hardening of endpoints to prevent unauthorized execution

Step 3: Why other SP Elements are secondary

SP Element 1 focuses on anomaly detection, not prevention.

SP Element 2 concerns inventory accuracy.

SP Element 7 applies after an incident has occurred.

Step 4: Preventive emphasis

The standard prioritizes prevention of malware introduction through controlled media usage, making SP Element 4 the most relevant.

The best practice for detection-in-depth according to ISA/IEC 62443 involves layering different types of security controls that operate effectively under multiple scenarios and across various zones within an environment. IDS (Intrusion Detection Systems) sensors deployed across multiple zones within a production environment exemplify this strategy. By positioning sensors in various strategic locations, organizations can monitor for anomalous activities and potential threats throughout their network, thus enhancing their ability to detect and respond to incidents before they escalate. This deployment aligns with the ISA/IEC 62443 focus on comprehensive coverage and redundancy in cybersecurity mechanisms, contrasting with relying solely on perimeter defenses or single-point security solutions.

For U.S. federal agencies, mandatory cybersecurity requirements under law are established through Federal Information Processing Standards (FIPS). FIPS are issued by the U.S. government and are legally enforceable for federal agencies and contractors when specified by statute or regulation. This legal enforceability distinguishes FIPS from voluntary standards and frameworks.

Step 1: Understand the legal nature of FIPS

FIPS are developed under U.S. law to define minimum security requirements for federal information systems. When a federal agency operates or procures information systems, compliance with applicable FIPS is mandatory. This makes FIPS a legal obligation rather than a best-practice recommendation.

Step 2: Differentiate standards vs regulations

ISA/IEC 62443 is an international consensus-based standard intended primarily for industrial automation and control systems. While widely adopted and referenced by regulators, it is not legally mandatory unless explicitly incorporated into law or contracts. Therefore, it does not satisfy the requirement “under law” by itself.

Step 3: Eliminate incorrect options

The EU Cyber Resilience Act applies to products placed on the European Union market and has no jurisdiction over U.S. federal agencies.

NIST SP 800-171 provides requirements for protecting Controlled Unclassified Information (CUI) in non-federal systems, but it becomes mandatory only through contractual flow-downs, not directly as federal law.

Step 4: Align with ISA/IEC 62443 perspective

ISA/IEC 62443 acknowledges that regulatory and legal obligations override voluntary standards. Asset owners must comply with applicable laws first, then apply ISA/IEC 62443 controls to meet industrial cybersecurity objectives.

Thus, for a U.S. federal agency facing mandatory cybersecurity requirements under law, NIST FIPS is the correct answer.

The Security Program (SP) portfolio is the correct foundational document for an evolving IACS cybersecurity approach according to the ISA/IEC 62443 family of standards. ISA/IEC 62443 is explicitly designed around the concept of continuous risk management and lifecycle-based cybersecurity, rather than static or one-time security implementations.

Step 1: Role of the Security Program (SP)

ISA/IEC 62443-2-1 defines the requirements for establishing, implementing, maintaining, and continuously improving an IACS Cybersecurity Management System. The Security Program provides organizational governance through policies, roles, responsibilities, procedures, training, incident handling, change management, and continuous improvement activities. These elements ensure cybersecurity adapts as threats, vulnerabilities, and system configurations evolve.

Step 2: Need for an evolving security approach

The standard recognizes that IACS environments are long-lived and subject to changing operational conditions, emerging threat actors, and new vulnerabilities. Therefore, cybersecurity must be managed as an ongoing process. The SP portfolio enables periodic reassessment of risks, updates to controls, and improvements to security processes throughout the system lifecycle.

Step 3: Relationship between SP and SPS

IEC 62443-2-2 introduces the Security Protection Scheme (SPS), which is a documented set of technical, procedural, and physical security measures selected to mitigate identified risks. However, the SPS is not the foundation; it is a product of the Security Program. The SP governs how the SPS is developed, implemented, operated, and modified over time.

Step 4: Elimination of incorrect options

“IEC 62443-2-2 only” is insufficient because it addresses SPS development without broader governance.

Corporate KPIs unrelated to IACS do not manage cybersecurity risk.

An SPS alone cannot evolve without programmatic oversight.

In alignment with the intent and structure of ISA/IEC 62443, the Security Program (SP) portfolio is the correct foundation for a cybersecurity plan that must continuously evolve.

 The risk analysis category of an IACS consists of two elements: business rationale and risk identification and classification1. Business rationale is the process of defining the scope, objectives, and criteria for the risk analysis, as well as the roles and responsibilities of the stakeholders involved. Risk identification and classification is the process of identifying the assets, threats, vulnerabilities, and consequences of a cyberattack on the IACS, and assigning a risk level to each scenario based on the likelihood and impact of the attack1. These elements are essential for establishing a baseline of the current risk posture of the IACS and determining the appropriate risk treatment measures to reduce the risk to an acceptable level. References: 1: ISA/IEC 62443-3-2:2020, Security for industrial automation and control systems - Part 3-2: Security risk assessment for system design, International Society of Automation, Research Triangle Park, NC, USA, 2020.

The second edition (2024) of ISA/IEC 62443-2-1 introduced a significant structural improvement by eliminating duplication of Information Security Management System (ISMS) requirements. The first edition (2010) contained content that overlapped substantially with ISO/IEC 27001-style ISMS controls, leading to redundancy and unnecessary implementation burden.

In the updated edition, ISA clarified that 62443-2-1 is not intended to replace a general-purpose ISMS, but rather to extend and specialize it for Industrial Automation and Control Systems (IACS). As a result, duplicated ISMS clauses were removed or streamlined, and the focus shifted to IACS-specific risks, operational realities, and lifecycle concerns.

This change improves:

Compatibility with existing enterprise ISMS implementations

Clarity of roles between IT security governance and OT security management

Practical adoption by asset owners operating both IT and OT environments

Importantly, supply chain security, lifecycle management, and organizational governance were not removed. Instead, they were better aligned and referenced to avoid redundancy. The PDCA model remains implicit but was not newly introduced in 2024.

Thus, the defining change is the elimination of duplicated ISMS requirements, making Option B correct.

The ISA99 Committee (which developed ISA/IEC 62443) defines the scope and impact of IACS cybersecurity incidents in terms of negative consequences.

Step 1: Recognized consequences

The standard identifies consequences such as:

Financial losses

Environmental damage

Endangerment of public or worker safety

Loss of proprietary or sensitive information

Step 2: Purpose of defining consequences

These consequences justify why IACS cybersecurity must prioritize availability, integrity, and safety in addition to confidentiality.

Step 3: Why increased product sales is excluded

“Increased product sales” is not a negative consequence and is not mentioned anywhere in the ISA99 scope as a result of a cybersecurity compromise.

Therefore, the correct answer is Increased product sales.