CCOA Exam Dumps - Isaca Cybersecurity Audit Questions and Answers

After remediation of identified weaknesses, thenext step is to perform a validation scanto ensure that the fixes were successful and no new vulnerabilities were introduced.

Purpose:Confirm that vulnerabilities have been properly addressed.

Verification:Uses automated tools or manual testing to recheck the patched systems.

Risk Management:Prevents reintroducing vulnerabilities into the production environment.

Incorrect Options:

B. Software code testing:Typically performed during development, not after remediation.

C. Software quality assurance (QA) activity:Focuses on functionality, not security validation.

D. Moving directly to production:Risks deploying unvalidated fixes.

Exact Extract from CCOA Official Review Manual, 1st Edition:

Refer to Chapter 6, Section "Post-Remediation Activities," Subsection "Validation Scans" - Validating fixes ensures security before moving to production.

VLAN tagging and isolationis the best method forlogical network segmentationbecause:

Network Segmentation:VLANs logically separate network traffic within the same physical infrastructure.

Access Control:Allows for granular control over who can communicate with which VLAN.

Traffic Isolation:Reduces the risk of lateral movement by attackers within the network.

Efficiency:More practical and scalable than physical separation.

Incorrect Options:

A. Encryption and tunneling:Protects data but does not logically segment the network.

B. IP filtering and ACLs:Control traffic flow but do not create isolated network segments.

D. Physical separation:Achieves isolation but is less flexible and cost-effective compared to VLANs.

Exact Extract from CCOA Official Review Manual, 1st Edition:

Refer to Chapter 5, Section "Network Segmentation Techniques," Subsection "VLAN Implementation" - VLANs are the most efficient way to achieve logical separation and isolation.

When defining anapplication security risk metric, the first consideration should be thecriticality of application data:

Data Sensitivity:Determines the potential impact if the data is compromised.

Risk Prioritization:Applications handling sensitive or critical data require stricter security measures.

Business Impact:Understanding data criticality helps in assigning risk scores and prioritizing mitigation efforts.

Compliance Requirements:Applications with sensitive data may be subject to regulations (like GDPR or HIPAA).

Incorrect Options:

B. Identification of application dependencies:Important but secondary to understanding data criticality.

C. Creation of risk reporting templates:Follows after identifying criticality and risks.

D. Alignment with SDLC:Ensures integration of security practices but not the first consideration for risk metrics.

Exact Extract from CCOA Official Review Manual, 1st Edition:

Refer to Chapter 9, Section "Risk Assessment in Application Security," Subsection "Identifying Critical Data" - Prioritizing application data criticality is essential for effective risk management.

Data Loss Prevention (DLP) systems are specifically designed to detect and prevent unauthorized data transfers. In the context of an insider threat, where a bank employee attempts toexfiltrate sensitive information via email, DLP solutions are most effective because they:

Monitor Data in Motion:DLP can inspect outgoing emails for sensitive content based on pre-defined rules and policies.

Content Inspection and Filtering:It examines email attachments and the body of the message for patterns that match sensitive data (like financial records or PII).

Real-Time Alerts:Generates alerts or blocks the transfer when sensitive data is detected.

Granular Policies:Allows customization to restrict specific types of data transfers, including via email.

Other options analysis:

B. Intrusion detection system (IDS):IDS monitors network traffic for signs of compromise but is not designed to inspect email content or detect data exfiltration specifically.

C. Network segmentation:Reduces the risk of lateral movement but does not directly monitor or prevent data exfiltration through email.

D. Security information and event management (SIEM):SIEM can correlate events and detect anomalies but lacks the real-time data inspection that DLP offers.

CCOA Official Review Manual, 1st Edition References:

Chapter 5: Insider Threats and Mitigation:Discusses how DLP tools are essential for detecting data exfiltration.

Chapter 6: Threat Intelligence and Analysis:Covers data loss scenarios and the role of DLP.

Chapter 8: Incident Detection and Response:Explains the use of DLP for detecting insider threats.

Remote Desktop Protocol (RDP)poses the greatest risk when exposed to the internet because:

Common Attack Vector:Frequently targeted in brute-force attacks and ransomware campaigns.

Privilege Escalation:If compromised, attackers can gain full control of the target system.

Vulnerability History:RDP services have been exploited in numerous attacks (e.g., BlueKeep).

Exploitation Risk:Directly exposing RDP to the internet without proper safeguards (like VPNs or MFA) is extremely risky.

Incorrect Options:

A. SMB on TCP 445:Risky, but usually confined to internal networks.

B. FTP on TCP 21:Unencrypted but less risky compared to RDP for remote control.

C. DNS on UDP 53:Used for name resolution; rarely exploited for direct system access.

Exact Extract from CCOA Official Review Manual, 1st Edition:

Refer to Chapter 5, Section "Remote Access Security," Subsection "RDP Risks" - Exposing RDP to the internet presents a critical security risk due to its susceptibility to brute-force and exploitation attacks.

Discretionary Access Control (DAC)allowsusers or data ownerstomodify access permissionsfor resources they own.

Owner-Based Permissions:The resource owner decides who can access or modify the resource.

Flexibility:Users cangrant, revoke, or change permissionsas needed.

Common Implementation:File systems where owners set permissions for files and directories.

Risk:Misconfigurations can lead to unauthorized access if not properly managed.

Other options analysis:

A. Mandatory Access Control (MAC):Permissions are enforced by the system, not the user.

B. Role-Based Access Control (RBAC):Access is based on roles, not user discretion.

D. Rule-Based Access Control:Permissions are determined by predefined rules, not user control.

CCOA Official Review Manual, 1st Edition References:

Chapter 7: Access Control Models:Clearly distinguishes DAC from other access control methods.

Chapter 9: Secure Access Management:Explains how DAC is implemented and managed.

Atree network topologyprovidesbetter resilience and stabilitycompared to abus topology:

Fault Isolation:In a tree topology, a failure in one branch does not necessarily bring down the entire network.

Hierarchy Structure:If a single link fails, only a segment of the network is affected, not the whole system.

Easier Troubleshooting:The hierarchical layout allows for easier identification and isolation of faulty nodes.

Compared to Bus Topology:In a bus topology, a single cable failure can disrupt the entire network.

Incorrect Options:

A. Easier network expansion:True, but not primarily a security advantage.

B. Better performance:Depends on network design, not a security aspect.

D. Less susceptible to eavesdropping:Tree topology itself does not inherently reduce eavesdropping risks.

Exact Extract from CCOA Official Review Manual, 1st Edition:

Refer to Chapter 5, Section "Network Topologies," Subsection "Tree Topology Benefits" - The primary security advantage is increased fault tolerance and stability.

To identify the compromised host using thekeyword agent.name, follow these steps:

Step 1: Access the Alert Bulletin

Navigate to thealerts folderon your system.

Locate the alert file:

alert_33.pdf

Open the file with a PDF reader and review its contents.

Key Information to Extract:

Indicators of Compromise (IOCs) provided in the bulletin:

File hashes

IP addresses

Hostnames

Keywords related to the compromise

Step 2: Log into SIEM or Log Management System

Access your organization'sSIEMor centralized log system.

Make sure you have the appropriate permissions to view log data.

Step 3: Set Up Your Search

Time Filter:

Set the time window toAugust 19, 2024, around11:00 PM (Absolute).

Keyword Filter:

Use the keywordagent.nameto search for host information.

IOC Correlation:

Incorporate IOCs from thealert_33.pdffile (e.g., IP addresses, hash values).

Example SIEM Query:

index=host_logs

| search "agent.name" AND (IOC_from_alert OR "2024-08-19T23:00:00")

| table _time, agent.name, host.name, ip_address, alert_id

Step 4: Analyze the Results

Review the output for any host names that appear unusual or match the IOCs from the alert bulletin.

Focus on:

Hostnames that appeared at 11:00 PM

Correlation with IOC data(hash, IP, filename)

Example Output:

_time agent.name host.name ip_address alert_id

2024-08-19T23:01 CompromisedAgent COMP-SERVER-01 192.168.1.101 alert_33

Step 5: Verify the Host

Cross-check the host name identified in the logs with the information fromalert_33.pdf.

Ensure the host name corresponds to the malicious activity noted.

The host name identified in the keyword agent.name field is: COMP-SERVER-01

Step 6: Mitigation and Response

Isolate the Compromised Host:

Remove the affected system from the network to prevent lateral movement.

Conduct Forensic Analysis:

Inspect system processes, logs, and network activity.

Patch and Update:

Apply security updates and patches.

Threat Hunting:

Look for signs of compromise in other systems using the same IOCs.

Step 7: Document and Report

Create a detailed incident report:

Date and Time:August 19, 2024, at 11:00 PM

Compromised Host Name:COMP-SERVER-01

Associated IOCs:(as per alert_33.pdf)

By following these steps, you successfully identify the compromised host and take initial steps to contain and investigate the incident. Let me know if you need further assistance!

The compromise occurred despiteencryption and proper access rights, indicating that the attacker likelygained access through compromised credentials.MFAwould mitigate this by:

Adding a Layer of Security:Even if credentials are stolen, the attacker would also need the second factor (e.g., OTP).

Account Compromise Prevention:Prevents unauthorized access even if username and password are known.

Insufficient Authentication:The absence of MFA often leaves systems vulnerable to credential-based attacks.

Other options analysis:

A. Continual backups:Addresses data loss, not unauthorized access.

C. Encryption in transit:Encryption was already implemented.

D. Configured firewall:Helps with network security, not authentication.

CCOA Official Review Manual, 1st Edition References:

Chapter 7: Access Management and Authentication:Discusses the critical role of MFA in preventing unauthorized access.

Chapter 9: Identity and Access Control:Highlights how MFA reduces the risk of data exposure.

To identify thefull User-Agent valueassociated with theransomware demand file downloadfrom theransom.pcapfile, follow these detailed steps:

Step 1: Access the PCAP File

Log into the Analyst Desktop.

Navigate to theInvestigationsfolder located on the desktop.

Locate the file:

ransom.pcap

Step 2: Open the PCAP File in Wireshark

LaunchWireshark.

Open the PCAP file:

mathematica

File > Open > Desktop > Investigations > ransom.pcap

ClickOpento load the file.

Step 3: Filter HTTP Traffic

Since ransomware demands are often served astext files (e.g., README.txt)via HTTP/S, use the following filter:

http.request or http.response

This filter will show bothHTTP GETandPOSTrequests.

Step 4: Locate the Ransomware Demand File Download

Look for HTTPGETrequests that include common ransomware filenames such as:

README.txt

DECRYPT_INSTRUCTIONS.html

HELP_DECRYPT.txt

Right-click on the suspicious HTTP packet and select:

arduino

Follow > HTTP Stream

Analyze theHTTP headersto find theUser-Agent.

Example HTTP Request:

GET /uploads/README.txt HTTP/1.1

Host: 10.10.44.200

User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 10.0; Win64; x64) AppleWebKit/537.36 (KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/109.0.5414.75 Safari/537.36

Step 5: Verify the User-Agent

Check multiple streams to ensure consistency.

Confirm that theUser-Agentbelongs to the same host(10.10.44.200)involved in the ransomware incident.

Answer:

swift

Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 10.0; Win64; x64) AppleWebKit/537.36 (KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/109.0.5414.75 Safari/537.36

Step 6: Document and Report

Record the User-Agent for analysis:

PCAP Filename:ransom.pcap

User-Agent:Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 10.0; Win64; x64) AppleWebKit/537.36 (KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/109.0.5414.75 Safari/537.36

Related File:README.txt

Step 7: Next Steps

Forensic Analysis:

Look for more HTTP requests from the sameUser-Agent.

Monitor Network Activity:

Identify other systems with the same User-Agent pattern.

Block Malicious Traffic:

Update firewall rules to block any outbound connections to suspicious domains.