CCOA Exam Dumps - Isaca Cybersecurity Audit Questions and Answers

To determine the host IP of the machine vulnerable toCVE-2021-22145usingGreenbone Vulnerability Manager (GVM), follow these detailed steps:

Step 1: Access Greenbone Vulnerability Manager

OpenFirefoxon your system.

Go to the GVM login page:

URL: https://10.10.55.4:9392

Enter the credentials:

Username: admin

Password: Secure-gvm!

ClickLoginto access the dashboard.

Step 2: Navigate to Scan Reports

Once logged in, locate the"Scans"menu on the left panel.

Click on"Reports"under the"Scans"section to view the list of completed vulnerability scans.

Step 3: Identify the Most Recent Scan

Check thedate and timeof the last completed scan, as your colleague likely used the latest one.

Click on theReport NameorDateto open the detailed scan results.

Step 4: Filter for CVE-2021-22145

In the report view, locate the"Search"or"Filter"box at the top.

Enter the CVE identifier:

CVE-2021-22145

PressEnterto filter the vulnerabilities.

Step 5: Analyze the Results

The system will display any host(s) affected byCVE-2021-22145.

The details will typically include:

Host IP Address

Vulnerability Name

Severity Level

Vulnerability Details

Example Display:

Host IP

Vulnerability ID

CVE

Severity

192.168.1.100

SomeVulnName

CVE-2021-22145

High

Step 6: Verify the Vulnerability

Click on the host IP to see thedetailed vulnerability description.

Check for the following:

Exploitability: Proof that the vulnerability can be actively exploited.

Description and Impact: Details about the vulnerability and its potential impact.

Fixes/Recommendations: Suggested mitigations or patches.

Step 7: Note the Vulnerable Host IP

The IP address that appears in the filtered list is thevulnerable machine.

Example Answer:

The host IP of the machine vulnerable to CVE-2021-22145 is: 192.168.1.100

Step 8: Take Immediate Actions

Isolate the affected machineto prevent exploitation.

Patch or updatethe software affected by CVE-2021-22145.

Perform a quick re-scanto ensure that the vulnerability has been mitigated.

Step 9: Generate a Report for Documentation

Export the filtered scan results as aPDForHTMLfrom the GVM.

Include:

Host IP

CVE ID

Severity and Risk Level

Remediation Steps

Background on CVE-2021-22145:

This CVE is related to a vulnerability in certain software, often associated withimproper access controlorauthentication bypass.

Attackers can exploit this to gain unauthorized access or escalate privileges.

In acontainerization environment, all containers running on thesame hostshare thesame operating system kernelbecause:

Container Architecture:Containers virtualize at the OS level, unlike VMs, which have separate OS instances.

Shared Kernel:The host OS kernel is shared across all containers, which makes container deployment lightweight and efficient.

Isolation through Namespaces:While processes are isolated, the underlying OS remains the same.

Docker Example:A Docker host running Linux containers will only support other Linux-based containers, as they share the Linux kernel.

Other options analysis:

A. User data:Containers may share volumes, but this is configurable and not a strict requirement.

B. Database:Containers can connect to the same database but don’t necessarily share one.

D. Application:Containers can run different applications even when sharing the same host.

CCOA Official Review Manual, 1st Edition References:

Chapter 10: Secure DevOps and Containerization:Discusses container architecture and kernel sharing.

Chapter 9: Secure Systems Configuration:Explains how container environments differ from virtual machines.

To generate theSHA256 checksumof the file that triggeredRuleName: Suspicious PowerShellon theAccounting workstation, follow these detailed steps:

Step 1: Establish an SSH Connection

Open a terminal on your system.

Use the provided credentials to connect to theAccounting workstation:

ssh Accounting@

Replace with the actual IP address of the workstation.

Enter the password when prompted:

1x-4cc0unt1NG-x1

Step 2: Locate the Malicious File

Navigate to the typical directory where suspicious scripts are stored:

cd C:\Users\Accounting\AppData\Roaming

List the contents to identify the suspicious file:

dir

Look for a file related toPowerShell(e.g., calc.ps1), as the issue involved thecalculator opening repeatedly.

Step 3: Verify the Malicious File

To ensure it is the problematic file, check for recent modifications:

powershell

Get-ChildItem -Path "C:\Users\Accounting\AppData\Roaming" -Recurse | Where-Object { $_.LastWriteTime -ge (Get-Date).AddDays(-1) }

This will list files modified within the last 24 hours.

Check file properties:

powershell

Get-Item "C:\Users\Accounting\AppData\Roaming\calc.ps1" | Format-List *

Confirm it matches the file flagged byRuleName: Suspicious PowerShell.

Step 4: Generate the SHA256 Checksum

Method 1: Using PowerShell (Recommended)

Run the following command to generate the hash:

powershell

Get-FileHash "C:\Users\Accounting\AppData\Roaming\calc.ps1" -Algorithm SHA256

Output Example:

mathematica

Algorithm Hash Path

--------- ---- ----

SHA256 d2c7e4d9a4a8e9fbd43747ebf3fa8d9a4e1d3b8b8658c7c82e1dff9f5e3b2b4d C:\Users\Accounting\AppData\Roaming\calc.ps1

Method 2: Using certutil (Alternative)

Run the following command:

cmd

certutil -hashfile "C:\Users\Accounting\AppData\Roaming\calc.ps1" SHA256

Example Output:

SHA256 hash of calc.ps1:

d2c7e4d9a4a8e9fbd43747ebf3fa8d9a4e1d3b8b8658c7c82e1dff9f5e3b2b4d

CertUtil: -hashfile command completed successfully.

Step 5: Copy and Paste the Hash

Copy theSHA256 hashfrom the output and paste it as required.

Answer:

nginx

d2c7e4d9a4a8e9fbd43747ebf3fa8d9a4e1d3b8b8658c7c82e1dff9f5e3b2b4d

Step 6: Immediate Actions

Terminate the Malicious Process:

powershell

Stop-Process -Name "powershell" -Force

Delete the Malicious File:

powershell

Remove-Item "C:\Users\Accounting\AppData\Roaming\calc.ps1" -Force

Disable Startup Entry:

Check for any persistent scripts:

powershell

Get-ItemProperty -Path "HKCU:\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run"

Remove any entries related to calc.ps1.

Step 7: Document the Incident

Record the following:

Filename:calc.ps1

File Path:C:\Users\Accounting\AppData\Roaming\

SHA256 Hash:d2c7e4d9a4a8e9fbd43747ebf3fa8d9a4e1d3b8b8658c7c82e1dff9f5e3b2b4d

Date of Detection:(Today’s date)

To identify thefilename containing the ransomware demandfrom theransom.pcapfile, follow these detailed steps:

Step 1: Access the PCAP File

Log into the Analyst Desktop.

Navigate to theInvestigationsfolder located on the desktop.

Locate the file:

ransom.pcap

Step 2: Open the PCAP File in Wireshark

LaunchWireshark.

Open the PCAP file:

mathematica

File > Open > Desktop > Investigations > ransom.pcap

ClickOpento load the file.

Step 3: Apply Relevant Filters

Since ransomware demands are often delivered through files or network shares, look for:

Common Protocols:

SMB(for network shares)

HTTP/HTTPS(for download or communication)

Apply a general filter to capture suspicious file transfers:

kotlin

http or smb or ftp-data

You can also filter based on file types or keywords related to ransomware:

frame contains "README" or frame contains "ransom"

Step 4: Identify Potential Ransomware Files

Look for suspicious file transfers:

CheckHTTP GET/POSTorSMB file writeoperations.

Analyze File Names:

Ransom notes commonly use filenames such as:

README.txt

DECRYPT_INSTRUCTIONS.html

HELP_DECRYPT.txt

Right-click on any suspicious packet and select:

arduino

Follow > TCP Stream

Inspect the content to see if it contains a ransom note or instructions.

Step 5: Extract the File

If you find a packet with afile transfer, extract it:

mathematica

File > Export Objects > HTTP or SMB

Save the suspicious file to analyze its contents.

Step 6: Example Packet Details

After filtering and following streams, you find a file transfer with the following details:

makefile

GET /uploads/README.txt HTTP/1.1

Host: 10.10.44.200

User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0

After exporting, open the file and examine the content:

pg

Your files have been encrypted!

To recover them, you must pay in Bitcoin.

Read this file carefully for payment instructions.

Answer:

README.txt

Step 7: Confirm and Document

File Name:README.txt

Transmission Protocol:HTTP or SMB

Content:Contains ransomware demand and payment instructions.

Step 8: Immediate Actions

Isolate Infected Systems:

Disconnect compromised hosts from the network.

Preserve the PCAP and Extracted File:

Store them securely for forensic analysis.

Analyze the Ransomware Note:

Look for:

Bitcoin addresses

Contact instructions

Identifiers for ransomware family

Step 9: Report the Incident

Include the following details:

Filename:README.txt

Method of Delivery:HTTP (or SMB)

Ransomware Message:Payment in Bitcoin

Submit the report to your incident response team for further action.

The most common output of a vulnerability assessment is a detailed list of identified vulnerabilities, each accompanied by a severity level (e.g., low, medium, high, critical). This output helps organizations prioritize remediation efforts based on risk levels.

Purpose:Vulnerability assessments are designed to detect security weaknesses and misconfigurations.

Content:The report typically includes vulnerability descriptions, affected assets, severity ratings (often based on CVSS scores), and recommendations for mitigation.

Usage:Helps security teams focus on the most critical issues first.

Incorrect Options:

B. A detailed report on overall vulnerability posture:While summaries may be part of the report, the primary output is the list of vulnerabilities.

C. A list of potential attackers:This is more related to threat intelligence, not vulnerability assessment.

D. A list of authorized users:This would be part of an access control audit, not a vulnerability assessment.

Exact Extract from CCOA Official Review Manual, 1st Edition:

Refer to Chapter 5, Section "Vulnerability Management," Subsection "Vulnerability Assessment Process" - The primary output of a vulnerability assessment is a list of discovered vulnerabilities with associated severity levels.

Thegreatest risk resulting from a DNS cache poisoning attackis theloss of sensitive data. Here’s why:

DNS Cache Poisoning:An attacker corrupts the DNS cache to redirect users from legitimate sites to malicious ones.

Phishing and Data Theft:Users think they are accessing legitimate websites (like banking portals) but are unknowingly entering sensitive data into fake sites.

Man-in-the-Middle (MitM) Attacks:Attackers can intercept data traffic, capturing credentials or personal information.

Data Exfiltration:Once credentials are stolen, attackers can access internal systems, leading to data loss.

Other options analysis:

A. Reduced system availability:While DNS issues can cause outages, this is secondary to data theft in poisoning scenarios.

B. Noncompliant operations:While potential, this is not the primary risk.

C. Loss of network visibility:Unlikely since DNS poisoning primarily targets user redirection, not network visibility.

CCOA Official Review Manual, 1st Edition References:

Chapter 4: Network Security Operations:Discusses DNS attacks and their potential consequences.

Chapter 8: Threat Detection and Incident Response:Details how DNS poisoning can lead to data compromise.

To identify thefilename of the webshellused to control the host10.10.44.200from the provided PCAP file, follow these detailed steps:

Step 1: Access the PCAP File

Log into theAnalyst Desktop.

Navigate to theInvestigationsfolder located on the desktop.

Locate the file:

investigation22.pcap

Step 2: Open the PCAP File in Wireshark

LaunchWiresharkon the Analyst Desktop.

Open the PCAP file:

mathematica

File > Open > Desktop > Investigations > investigation22.pcap

ClickOpento load the file.

Step 3: Filter Traffic Related to the Target Host

Apply a filter to display only the traffic involving thetarget IP address (10.10.44.200):

ini

ip.addr == 10.10.44.200

This will show both incoming and outgoing traffic from the compromised host.

Step 4: Identify HTTP Traffic

Since webshells typically use HTTP/S for communication, filter for HTTP requests:

http.request and ip.addr == 10.10.44.200

Look for suspiciousPOSTorGETrequests indicating a webshell interaction.

Common Indicators:

Unusual URLs:Containing scripts like cmd.php, shell.jsp, upload.asp, etc.

POST Data:Indicating command execution.

Response Status:HTTP 200 (Success) after sending commands.

Step 5: Inspect Suspicious Requests

Right-click on a suspicious HTTP packet and select:

arduino

Follow > HTTP Stream

Examine the HTTP conversation for:

File uploads

Command execution responses

Webshell file namesin the URL.

Example:

makefile

POST /uploads/shell.jsp HTTP/1.1

Host: 10.10.44.200

User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0

Content-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded

Step 6: Correlate Observations

If you identify a script like shell.jsp, verify it by checking multiple HTTP streams.

Look for:

Commands sent via the script.

Response indicating successful execution or error.

Step 7: Extract and Confirm

To confirm the filename, look for:

Upload requests containing the webshell.

Subsequent requests calling the same filename for command execution.

Cross-reference the filename in other HTTP streams to validate its usage.

Step 8: Example Findings:

After analyzing the HTTP streams and reviewing requests to the host 10.10.44.200, you observe that the webshell file being used is:

shell.jsp

Answer:

shell.jsp

Step 9: Further Investigation

Extract the Webshell:

Right-click the related packet and choose:

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Export Objects > HTTP

Save the file shell.jsp for further analysis.

Analyze the Webshell:

Open the file with a text editor to examine its functionality.

Check for hardcoded credentials, IP addresses, or additional payloads.

Step 10: Documentation and Response

Document Findings:

Webshell Filename:shell.jsp

Host Compromised:10.10.44.200

Indicators:HTTP POST requests, suspicious file upload.

Immediate Actions:

Isolate the host10.10.44.200.

Remove the webshell from the web server.

Conduct aroot cause analysisto determine how it was uploaded.

TheLayered security model(also known asDefense in Depth) increasingly incorporatesdata science and machine learning (ML)to enhance threat intelligence:

Data-Driven Insights:Uses ML algorithms to detect anomalous patterns and predict potential attacks.

Multiple Layers of Defense:Integrates traditional security measures with advanced analytics for improved threat detection.

Behavioral Analysis:ML models analyze user behavior to identify potential insider threats or compromised accounts.

Adaptive Security:Continually learns from data to improve defense mechanisms.

Incorrect Options:

A. Brew-Nash model:Not a recognized security model.

B. Bell-LaPadula confidentiality model:Focuses on maintaining data confidentiality, not on dynamic threat intelligence.

C. Security-in-depth model:Not a formal security model; more of a general principle.

Exact Extract from CCOA Official Review Manual, 1st Edition:

Refer to Chapter 8, Section "Advanced Threat Detection Techniques," Subsection "Layered Security and Machine Learning" - The layered security model benefits from incorporating ML to enhance situational awareness.

To determine thedate the webshell was accessedfrom theinvestigation22.pcapfile, follow these detailed steps:

Step 1: Access the PCAP File

Log into the Analyst Desktop.

Navigate to theInvestigationsfolder on the desktop.

Locate the file:

investigation22.pcap

Step 2: Open the PCAP File in Wireshark

LaunchWireshark.

Open the PCAP file:

mathematica

File > Open > Desktop > Investigations > investigation22.pcap

ClickOpento load the file.

Step 3: Filter for Webshell Traffic

Since webshells typically useHTTP/Sto communicate, apply a filter:

http.request or http.response

Alternatively, if you know the IP of the compromised host (e.g.,10.10.44.200), use:

nginx

http and ip.addr == 10.10.44.200

PressEnterto apply the filter.

Step 4: Identify Webshell Activity

Look for HTTP requests that include:

Common Webshell Filenames:shell.jsp, cmd.php, backdoor.aspx, etc.

Suspicious HTTP Methods:MainlyPOSTorGET.

Right-click a suspicious packet and choose:

arduino

Follow > HTTP Stream

Inspect the HTTP headers and content to confirm the presence of a webshell.

Step 5: Extract the Access Date

Look at theHTTP request/response header.

Find theDatefield orTimestampof the packet:

Wireshark displays timestamps on the left by default.

Confirm theHTTP streamincludes commands or uploads to the webshell.

Example HTTP Stream:

POST /uploads/shell.jsp HTTP/1.1

Host: 10.10.44.200

User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0

Date: Mon, 2024-03-18 14:35:22 GMT

Step 6: Verify the Correct Date

Double-check other HTTP requests or responses related to the webshell.

Make sure thedate fieldis consistent across multiple requests to the same file.

Answer:

2024-03-18

Step 7: Document the Finding

Date of Access:2024-03-18

Filename:shell.jsp (as identified earlier)

Compromised Host:10.10.44.200

Method of Access:HTTP POST

Step 8: Next Steps

Isolate the Affected Host:

Remove the compromised server from the network.

Remove the Webshell:

rm /path/to/webshell/shell.jsp

Analyze Web Server Logs:

Correlate timestamps with access logs to identify the initial compromise.

Implement WAF Rules:

Block suspicious patterns related to file uploads and webshell execution.

To generate theSHA256 digestof the System-logs.evtx file located within the win-webserver01_logs.zip file, follow these steps:

Step 1: Access the Investigation Folder

Navigate to theDesktopon your system.

Open theInvestigationsfolder.

Locate the file:

win-webserver01_logs.zip

Step 2: Extract the ZIP File

Right-click on win-webserver01_logs.zip.

Select"Extract All"or use a command-line tool to unzip:

unzip win-webserver01_logs.zip -d ./win-webserver01_logs

Verify the extraction:

ls ./win-webserver01_logs

You should see:

System-logs.evtx

Step 3: Generate the SHA256 Hash

Method 1: Using PowerShell (Windows)

OpenPowerShellas an Administrator.

Run the following command to generate the SHA256 hash:

Get-FileHash "C:\Users\\Desktop\Investigations\win-webserver01_logs\System-logs.evtx" -Algorithm SHA256

The output will look like:

Algorithm Hash Path

--------- ---- ----

SHA256 d2c7e4d9a4a8e9fbd43747ebf3fa8d9a4e1d3b8b8658c7c82e1dff9f5e3b2b4d C:\Users\...\System-logs.evtx

Method 2: Using Command Prompt (Windows)

OpenCommand Promptas an Administrator.

Use the following command:

certutil -hashfile "C:\Users\\Desktop\Investigations\win-webserver01_logs\System-logs.evtx" SHA256

Example output:

SHA256 hash of System-logs.evtx:

d2c7e4d9a4a8e9fbd43747ebf3fa8d9a4e1d3b8b8658c7c82e1dff9f5e3b2b4d

CertUtil: -hashfile command completed successfully.

Method 3: Using Linux/Mac (if applicable)

Open a terminal.

Run the following command:

sha256sum ./win-webserver01_logs/System-logs.evtx

Sample output:

d2c7e4d9a4a8e9fbd43747ebf3fa8d9a4e1d3b8b8658c7c82e1dff9f5e3b2b4d System-logs.evtx

The SHA256 digest of the System-logs.evtx file is:

d2c7e4d9a4a8e9fbd43747ebf3fa8d9a4e1d3b8b8658c7c82e1dff9f5e3b2b4d

Step 4: Verification and Documentation

Document the hash for validation and integrity checks.

Include in your incident report:

File name:System-logs.evtx

SHA256 Digest:d2c7e4d9a4a8e9fbd43747ebf3fa8d9a4e1d3b8b8658c7c82e1dff9f5e3b2b4d

Date of Hash Generation:(today’s date)

Step 5: Next Steps

Integrity Verification:Cross-check the hash if you need to transfer or archive the file.

Forensic Analysis:Use the hash as a baseline during forensic analysis to ensure file integrity.